ARTICLE

INTEREST-BASED INCORPORATION: STATUTORY
REALISM EXPLORING FEDERALISM, DELEGATION, AND
DEMOCRATIC DESIGN

SHELDON A. EVANS†
Statutory interpretation is a unique legal field that appreciates fiction as much
as fact. For years, judges and scholars have acknowledged that canons of
interpretation are often based on erudite assumptions of how Congress drafts
federal statutes. But a recent surge in legal realism has shown just how erroneous
many of these assumptions are. Scholars have created a robust study of
congressional practices that challenge many formalist canons of interpretation that
are divorced from how Congress thinks about, drafts, and enacts federal statutes.
This conversation, however, has yet to confront statutory incorporation, which
describes when Congress incorporates state law into federal statutes. Statutory
incorporation is one of the most common legislative tools employed by Congress
and has been used to enact hundreds of federal statutes that affect liberty and
property rights across multiple areas of law. Traditional analyses of statutory
incorporation argue that it allows Congress to achieve goals of federalism and/or
delegation, both of which empower state governments to shape federal policies. But
this traditional narrative falls short when held up to the scrutiny of statutory
realism.
This Article offers an alternative explanation: specifically, that statutory
incorporation is a tool that allows Congress to abdicate federal legislative
responsibility and pass it on to the states, which in turn allows the politically
motivated members of Congress to avoid political accountability. This theory of
a more interest-based statutory incorporation is an important contribution that
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adds to the growing realism literature in the statutory incorporation field and
carries important implications for the future of scrutinizing the fictions that
dominate this space.
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INTRODUCTION
We live in a Republic of Statutes that is maintained by fictions.1 If the
Constitution is our foundation, statutes are the beams, walls, and roof that
1 See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN A. FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF
STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2010) (describing the shift from an American
legal system dominated by common law to one dominated by statutes); see also Lisa Schultz
Bressman, Reclaiming the Legal Fiction of Congressional Delegation, 97 VA. L. REV. 2009, 2025-30 (2011)
(listing scholars’ criticisms of using legal fictions in statutory incorporation doctrine).
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shape our democracy. They define modern notions of Our Federalism and our
growing bureaucracy, all while bestowing thousands of federal rights to
citizens and noncitizens alike. Yet the ways that statutes are interpreted have
been acknowledged by many scholars as exercises of fiction.2 Courts have had
to contended with the complexities, confusions, and inconsistencies that
embody statutory design, resulting in canons of interpretation to make sense
of Congress’s befuddlements. Formalists use these canons3 to divine
congressional intent, but these legal fictions are divorced from how Congress
actually thinks about and drafts statutes. This has given rise to a new
movement of legal realism within the statutory interpretation community
that seeks to bridge the growing divide between how judges and scholars
think about interpreting statutes and how Congress thinks about drafting
statutes.4 Through surveys, interviews, and careful research within the
Capitol itself, Professors Victoria Nourse and Jane Schacter, Abbe Gluck and
Lisa Schultz Bressman, and others have developed this new realist approach
to statutory interpretation—referred to below as statutory realism—that
challenges formalists and the canons they champion.5
2 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L.
REV. 885, 887, 921-22, 928 (2003) (arguing rules of interpretation should favor simple administrable
rules because courts’ institutional capacity is too limited to understand complexities of the inner
workings of Congress); see also Bressman, supra note 1, at 2009-10, 2025-30 (discussing Congress’s
tendency to intentionally pass the burden of statutory interpretation to administrative agencies
whenever it does not clearly explain the meaning of a statute).
3 Compare Abbe R. Gluck, Congress, Statutory Interpretation, and the Failure of Formalism: The
CBO Canon and Other Ways That Courts Can Improve on What They Are Already Trying to Do, 84 U.
CHI. L. REV. 177, 178-79 (2017) (describing formalism’s reliance on canons as a “failure . . . that
sacrifices accurate approximation of congressional practice in favor of efficient, and objective,
system-coordinating rules”), with John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113,
176 (defending formalism’s use of canons as “shared semantic conventions”).
4 I refer to these scholars as realists based on their dissatisfaction with formalist canons to explain
how Congress drafts statutes. See generally Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism—Responding to
Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1235-38 (1931) (outlining foundations of legal realism).
5 See generally Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A
Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (2002) (conducting surveys and interviews of
congressional staffers and committee staff on the Senate Judiciary Committee); see also Abbe R. Gluck
& Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional
Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901 (2013) [hereinafter Gluck & Bressman,
Statutory Interpretation Part I] (conducting surveys and interviews across several congressional staffers,
committees, and support departments); Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation
from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN.
L. REV. 725 (2014) [hereinafter Gluck & Bressman, Statutory Interpretation Part II] (same); Jarrod Shobe,
Intertemporal Statutory Interpretation and the Evolution of Legislative Drafting, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 807, 850
(2014) (outlining improvements and professionalism in congressional drafting practices); Ganesh
Sitaraman, The Origins of Legislation, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 79 (2015) (providing typology of the
different origins and drafting processes of congressional statutes); see generally Abigail R. Moncrieff,
Statutory Realism: The Jurisprudential Ambivalence of Interpretive Theory, 72 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 39 (2019)
(highlighting the formalism and realism presuppositions of modern interpretive theory); Max Radin,
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This Article seeks to expand and contribute to statutory realism by applying
it to a unique congressional drafting tool known as statutory incorporation.
Congress has used statutory incorporation to incorporate state law into
hundreds of federal statutes that result in a host of federal rights and liabilities
being dependent on the myriad variations of state law. Scholars have
contemplated that such diffusion of federal power to the states can be
characterized as a form of federalism; others have studied this through the lens
of it being a unique congressional delegation of power to state legislatures. This
Article contributes to this conversation by developing further statutory realism
theory and applying it to explain this odd statutory design. By drawing from the
drafting realities that govern the legislative process, this Article argues that the
federalism- and delegation-based justifications for statutory incorporation are
mere legal fictions. While these legal fictions have their uses,6 they are
nevertheless divorced from the real justifications of why Congress chooses to
incorporate state law into federal statutes.
In light of these practical realities, this Article presents a new justification
that holds more explanatory power over this “why” question. While it does not
benefit from the same qualitative research in the Capitol that gave rise to the
statutory realism paradigm, this Article gains insight from law and economics
and positive political theory to present a new theory of interest-based
incorporation. Interest-based incorporation recognizes that congressmembers
use statutory incorporation to maximize their individual political self-interests
while minimizing political risk. Congressmembers are less concerned with
ivory-tower theories of federalism and delegation and more concerned with
pragmatic goals of promoting their self-interest of reelection.
This new realization is one of the primary contributions of applying statutory
realism to statutory incorporation; it relieves judges from interpreting these
statutes according to the fictitious congressional intent of promoting federalism
or delegation. Instead, courts and scholars alike have a new tool at their disposal
to interpret these statutes in ways that accurately track congressional design,
which in turn is rooted in self-interest.
Statutory realism as a theoretical and practical school of interpretation has
much to contend with from the vast literature and prominent advocacy of others

Realism in Statutory Interpretation and Elsewhere, 23 CALIF. L. REV. 156 (1935) (arguing that a Supreme
Court case interpreting a bankruptcy statute was interpreted according to the real life realities of rent
collection and rent projection as opposed to formalist canons of interpretation).
6 See Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 2, at 928-31 (arguing that courts benefit from simple legal
rules of interpretation by using agency interpretations of law as an example); Gluck & Bressman,
Statutory Interpretation Part I, supra note 5, at 961-64 (stating that scholars and members of the judiciary
justify the use of legal fictions because courts have a duty to ensure that the law is coherent).
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in the field. Textualists, intentionalists, and purposivists7 (to name a few) will
likely have their own views that might explain statutory incorporation. Justifying
statutory realism among its sister theories of interpretation is outside the
scope of this Article. This scholarly conversation may indeed proceed with
critique from other schools, and responses will follow in due course.
Instead, this Article only seeks to bolster the qualitative research that has
come before in the context of federal statutes that incorporate state law.
Part I gives an overview of the impactful frequency of statutory
incorporation. Congress has used statutory incorporation in hundreds of
statutes across criminal, immigration, bankruptcy, social security, tort, and
other areas of federal law.8 So when a federal criminal statute provides that
both federal and state versions of “burglary” can carry a federal
consequence,9 or that state and local property regimes affect a debtor’s
assets in federal bankruptcy court,10 Congress intentionally incorporates the
law of all fifty states into these federal statutes in outcome determinative
ways. In other words, a person’s life, liberty, and property under hundreds
of federal statutes depends on the application of state law.
Courts and scholars have long struggled with the moral and practical
implications that arise from statutory incorporation, namely that it
necessarily produces enormous disparities in federal rights based on the
many variances of state law. Under the same federal statute, similar
defendants, debtors, and even those struggling to apply for social security
benefits enjoy different federal rights depending on the state of their
domicile.11 When the difference between a noncitizen being deported or a
child getting survivorship benefits is largely dependent on the state in
which they live, this creates a conundrum. How can the presumption of
nationwide uniformity in federal law be reliable when such federal law seeks
to prioritize state preferences?12 Let’s consider Person A who lives in State
A and Person B who lives in State B. Under federalism and the state’s
7 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, Theories of
Statutory Interpretation, in LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 219-56 (2d ed. 2006)
(providing introduction to different schools of statutory interpretation).
8 See Joshua M. Divine, Statutory Federalism and Criminal Law, 106 VA. L. REV. 127, 129 (2020)
(overviewing the breadth of statutory incorporation).
9 See infra Section I.A.
10 See infra Section I.B.
11 See, e.g., Sheldon A. Evans, Categorical Nonuniformity, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1771, 1787-88, 1792-94
(2020) (surveying disparities caused by statutory incorporation in criminal and immigration law).
12 See, e.g., United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979) (“Undoubtedly, federal
programs that by their nature are and must be uniform in character throughout the Nation necessitate
formulation of controlling federal rules . . . . Conversely, when there is little need for a nationally uniform
body of law, state law may be incorporated as the federal rule of decision.” (internal quotations and citations
omitted)); see also Evans, supra note 11, at 1799-1811 (considering tensions between nationwide uniformity and
principles of federalism).
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sovereign police powers, we recognize that even if Person A and Person B
commit the same crime, have the same property, or have other similarities
between them, State A can treat Person A much differently than State B
chooses to treat Person B. But when the situation changes to instead include
the federal government, should this unitary sovereign treat Person A
differently than Person B under federal law because they live in different
states? Statutory incorporation triggers these difficult theoretical, moral, and
economic questions because one incorporative federal statute is effectively
fifty statutes that apply differently in each state. These questions have been
difficult to answer among the judiciary who usually find themselves split
between two ends of a spectrum. At one end, judges have tried to apply these
paradoxical laws as faithful agents of congressional intent. At the other end,
judges have complained about the moral problems, legal loopholes, and
confusing interpretations they have had to create to make sense of statutory
incorporation.13
Part II transitions from these judicial complaints by filtering them
through the theoretical justifications of statutory incorporation. Federalism
scholars have commented on how it offers insight into the modern era of
federal and state relations that yield the benefits of diffusing power,
experimentation, competition, and political engagement. This naturally
dovetails with delegation and administrative law scholars that highlight
statutory incorporation’s contribution to delegation theory. These scholars
argue that statutory incorporation is Congress’s attempt to benefit from the
expertise of the states while also ensuring superior political accountability,
since state legislators may be more attuned and accountable to local
constituents.
But these alleged benefits underappreciate the most important aspect of
statutory incorporation: it is a one-way, unilateral transfer of power.
Statutory incorporation cannot be likened to modern cooperative federalism
regimes when states act as powerful agents to implement federal policy
goals.14 It is not a two-way partnership, negotiation, or exchange of power
between the federal and state governments. Instead, Congress simply
incorporates state law without any input from or notice to the states. If this
is federalism, it could only be characterized as such in its weakest form.
Consequently, statutory incorporation carries little of the traditional benefits
associated with federalism. Further, the statutory realism literature has
documented that congressional staffers, negotiators, and drafters consider

See infra notes 117–119 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE
L.J. 1256, 1259-60 (2009) (describing power of states as agents when implementing federal policies).
13
14
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federalism as a tangential theory that does not drive the legislative process
for many statutes.15
Delegation theory also proves incomplete when explaining statutory
incorporation. Congressional delegations are the subject of a vast literature
that acknowledges the principal-agent relationship when Congress seeks to
delegate lawmaking authority to executive agencies.16 In such relationships,
Congress benefits from the expertise that agencies can provide while still
being able to keep these agencies accountable through rulemaking
procedures, budget allocations, congressional hearings, and periodic
reporting requirements. But these benefits of the principal–agent
relationship are not present when Congress delegates federal lawmaking
authority to a lesser state legislature. State legislatures have no superior
expertise and enjoy far fewer resources and staff than Congress itself. Further,
Congress cannot control state legislatures with the same tools they use to
exercise supervision over administrative lawmaking processes. Once again,
the unilateral transfer of power prevents any benefits of expertise and control
that traditionally justify delegations to administrative agencies. Statutory
realism surveys cast even more doubt on delegation theory, finding that
congressional drafters rarely consider delegating lawmaking power to any
other political actor other than executive agencies.17 Thus, there is no
evidence to suggest congressional drafters contemplate delegating to state
legislatures at all. For all the purported benefits of federalism and delegation
that statutory incorporation might embody, the existing literature has not fully
accounted for these critiques and shortfalls.
Part III sidelines these incomplete theories of statutory incorporation by
proposing another justification yet to garner serious consideration in the
literature. It begins with the premise that politicians are self-interested
economic actors, which is widely acknowledged across several political and
legal fields of scholarship. Consequently, congressmembers are primarily
motivated by reelection and their personal legislative legacy.18 This
incentivizes them to maximize legislative productivity while minimizing
political risk. These realities are what makes statutory incorporation such an
attractive legislative tool.
First, it allows congressmembers to pass laws and champion issues for
their constituencies while also allowing them to pass blame for undesirable
outcomes onto state officials. To federalism theorists, this might look like
See infra notes 171–175 and accompanying text.
See Abbe R. Gluck, Our [National] Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1996, 2023 n.120 (2014)
[hereinafter Gluck, Our [National] Federalism] (calling Chevron “one of the most cited cases in
history” and outlining a small sample of the hundreds of commentators have weighed in).
17 See infra notes 214–215 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 220–221 and accompanying text.
15
16
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diffusing power to the states. To delegation theorists, this might look like
delegating lawmaking authority to the states. To interest-based theorists, this
looks like taking credit for positive results while diffusing and delegating
blame to the states in cases of negative results. Thus, congressmembers get
the political benefits from passing impactful laws that are tough on crime,
deport potentially dangerous noncitizens, reform social security, and provide
second chances for debtors. And if a criminal or noncitizen gets off the hook,
or a beneficiary fails to get needed social security benefits, or a debtor fails to
keep up with their bankruptcy payment plan, the political backlash that might
come from such negative results can be appropriately redirected to the
shortcomings of state law and the state officials who apply it.
Second, statutory incorporation allows congressmembers to benefit from
interest group politics. This interest group reasoning adopts the findings of
statutory realism and other studies that confirm just how involved lobbyists
and other interest groups are in the legislative drafting process. Given that
congressmembers and legislative drafters can benefit from the research
resources and policy expertise of these groups, it follows that
congressmembers can also benefit by simultaneously fostering connections
that can help their future political campaigns. In return, these interest
groups enjoy incredible influence in the statutory drafting process. For their
part, interest groups are interested in swaying congressional drafters to
incorporate state law to benefit their national and regional clients. Crafting
federal law to incorporate state law shifts power to state legislatures. This
allows these powerful interest groups to efficiently target particular states
according to their national or regional strategies without the expense and
difficulty of lobbying Congress to pass laws that require much more time,
resources, and the potential failure to garner the necessary legislative
coalition to pass and enact laws.
Third, statutory incorporation empowers congressmembers to
intentionally negotiate ambiguity into federal statutes. This is a
longstanding legislative tradition that allows congressmembers to navigate
the myriad of difficulties that might otherwise derail the drafting process.
By intentionally drafting ambiguous terms into a statute, drafters can
overcome time constraints, a lack of research, and can provide a means for
two or more disagreeing negotiators to agree on language that may be
interpreted in their favor by courts and agencies in the future. As applied to
statutory incorporation, incorporating state law has many of the same
benefits of ambiguity. Instead of doing the difficult work of legislating,
congressional drafters can bypass the time-consuming tasks of negotiating
difficult issues, researching those issues, and finding common ground by
instead incorporating state law. Such an incorporation increases legislative
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efficiency by allowing opposing negotiators to leave knowing that the federal
law will be interpreted and applied differently in each state, thus satisfying
each opposing negotiator that their constituents will be subject to their own
preferred state laws.
While the interest-based theory of statutory incorporation is the main
contribution of this Article, Part IV continues by discussing the judicial and
legislative implications. Interest-based incorporation would allow courts to
develop doctrine around the legal fictions of federalism- and delegation-based
incorporation. Instead, courts would benefit from developing canons based in
statutory realism that properly consider the self-interested goals of Congress.
These canons would not faithfully apply Congress’s self-interests but could
rather serve as a check to congressional abdication of lawmaking authority.
Ambiguity canons—such as the rule of lenity that already exists in criminal,
immigration, and bankruptcy law19—could be repurposed to interpret federal
incorporative statutes in the light most favorable of defendants, noncitizens,
and debtors. Courts could also check congressional self-interests by
developing a highest-denominator canon that applied a single state’s law—
the one that is most favorable to defendants, noncitizens, and debtors—to the
entire country. This would carry the benefits of federal nationwide uniformity
while also empowering states’ laws based on their beneficial nature and
expertise. Courts might also consider doctrinal lines with a federal–state
interest canon, tailoring their interpretation of an incorporative statute based
on whether it forwards a traditional federal interest or is a subject of law
traditionally left to the states. On the one hand, such a canon would strictly
interpret traditional federal interest, such as immigration, to mitigate
variations of outcomes caused by differing state laws. On the other hand,
courts would exercise much more leniency in interpreting incorporative laws
that govern traditional state interests, such as criminal laws, to allow for
variation of state preferences.
In addition to potential judicial interventions, interest-based incorporation
can also guide how members of Congress might maximize their self-interests
without the problems that arise from statutory incorporation. First, Congress
might consider expanding its own institutional resources by increasing its
budget and creating an additional legislative research department. This would
diminish its dependence on interest groups while also empowering Congress
itself to do the type of research and analysis to inform congressmembers of
the potential disparate impacts statutory incorporation could have on their
constituents. This could also be an opportunity to empower state legislatures
by creating or including an existing council of state legislatures as an advisory
agency to Congress. Thus, any future use of statutory incorporation would
19

See infra notes 262–272 and accompanying text.
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benefit from the additional research and expertise of state law from the states
themselves.
In light of the breadth of statutory incorporation and the problems it
causes as highlighted in Part I, the theoretical shortcomings of federalismand delegation-based justifications in Part II, the explanatory contribution of
interest-based incorporation in Part III, and how this contribution can
positively inform practical judicial and legislative interventions in Part IV,
this Article stands at the crossroads of integrating statutory incorporation in
practice, theory, and reform.
I. INCORPORATIVE INCLUSIONS
Congress’s use of statutory incorporation forms the bedrock of many
federal statutory rights. Instead of being limited to niche areas, Congress has
used statutory incorporation in hundreds of statutes across criminal,
immigration, bankruptcy, social security, tort, and many other contexts in a
one-size-fits all approach that raises questions as to its efficacy across such
diverse subjects.20 This Part is not meant to be an exhaustive account of all
instances of statutory incorporation, but instead focuses on specific areas of
law to achieve two goals. First, this Part illustrates the sheer breadth of
statutory incorporation by highlighting the diverse subject matters that these
statutes cover. Second, this Part highlights the inherent flaws of statutory
incorporation. Because the myriad variations of state law are incorporated
into federal statutes, these statutes produce nonuniformity, judicial confusion
and critique, and moral dubiety. This Part displays these shortcomings and
establishes the foundational problems that are necessary to understand the
theoretical critiques of statutory incorporation in the later Parts of the
Article.
At the outset, it is important to introduce the various types of statutory
incorporation that are relevant for the discussion below. One important
distinction is the difference between static and dynamic incorporation.21
Static incorporation occurs when the incorporating jurisdiction incorporates
another jurisdiction’s law as it exists at the time of incorporation; thus, the
law and its incorporation remains static. This is materially different from
dynamic incorporation that seeks to incorporate another jurisdiction’s law, as

20 See, e.g., Gluck, Our [National] Federalism, supra note 16, at 2008 (providing a brief overview
of statutory incorporation’s breadth across federal law).
21 See John F. Coyle, Incorporative Statutes and the Borrowed Treaty Rule, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 655,
664-69 (2010) (discussing different types of incorporative statutes); see also Divine, supra note 8, at
138-43 (providing taxonomy of dynamic statutory incorporation statutes).
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it might change dynamically over time.22 If Jurisdiction A dynamically
incorporates Jurisdiction B’s law, whenever Jurisdiction B changes that law, so
too does it change the law of Jurisdiction A.23 This is materially different from
static incorporation, whereas when Jurisdiction B changes its law, Jurisdiction
A’s law would not change since it incorporated Jurisdiction B’s law based on a
snapshot in time as it existed when the incorporation was enacted. Comparing
the two, static incorporation maintains the lawmaking authority and
accountability of the incorporating jurisdiction. Commentators have warned
that dynamic incorporation, however, may improperly delegate lawmaking
authority to other jurisdictions.24 As a practical matter, dynamic incorporation
gifts Jurisdiction B with the power to control impactful laws that govern the
people of another jurisdiction; and to make matters more problematic, the
people of Jurisdiction A cannot hold Jurisdiction B’s lawmakers accountable
through the political process.25 Some states have found this so problematic that
they have banned their legislatures from using dynamic incorporation.26 While
this Article discusses these important implications, it does so by covering the
shortfalls of both static and dynamic incorporation.
In addition to dynamic vs. static incorporation, there are also tiers reflecting
how much of another jurisdiction’s law is being incorporated. Joshua Divine’s
work provides a useful categorical framework for federal statutes that
dynamically incorporate state law.27 These include opt-out statutes (when state
legislatures provide safe harbor protections against the liabilities of federal law),
opt-in statutes (when Congress provides a federal penalty for violations of state
law), triggering statutes (when Congress provides a federal penalty that can only
be triggered for violating certain state laws), and catch-all scope statutes (when
22 See Paul J. Larkin Jr., The Dynamic Incorporation of Foreign Law and the Constitutional
Regulation of Federal Lawmaking, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 337, 359-60 (2015) (describing
differences between static and dynamic incorporation).
23 See Michael C. Dorf, Dynamic Incorporation of Foreign Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 126 (2008)
(observing that dynamic incorporation includes both legislative changes to the law and judicial
interpretations of the same).
24 See, e.g., F. Scott Boyd, Looking Glass Law: Legislation by Reference in the States, 68 LA. L.
REV. 1201, 1203, 1275-77 (2008) (discussing risks and unintended consequences of statutory
incorporation for states and delegation doctrine requiring that legislatures delegate to agents over
which they have sufficient oversight and control).
25 See Larkin, supra note 22, at 360 (“[W]hen Congress gives someone else the power to define
federal law, Congress is delegating federal lawmaking authority to an ‘outsider,’ someone not in one
of those three categories of people [Representatives, Senators, and the President] elected to federal
office.”).
26 See Boyd, supra note 24, at 1203 n.7 (detailing state courts that have declared delegations to
other state laws unconstitutional); see also Jim Rossi, Dynamic Incorporation of Federal Law, 77 OHIO
ST. L.J. 457, 471-72 (2016) (“[S]tate constitutional structural provisions, including separation of
powers doctrines such as nondelegation, limited the authority of state lawmakers to use federal law
to define future crimes . . . .”).
27 See Divine, supra note 8, at 138-43 (explaining four types of dynamic incorporation).
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Congress allows state law to determine how broadly or narrowly federal
provisions might apply).28 As discussed in this Part, all forms of statutory
incorporation come with problematic aspects that necessitates intervention
from the judiciary to interpret the statutes in an attempt to make sense of
their difficult draftsmanship. But appreciating these different types of
incorporation in different subject areas of the law informs later discussions
about the justifications for different types of incorporation and potential
solutions.
A. Criminal & Immigration Law
The impact of statutory incorporation is perhaps most widely felt in the
criminal law, which has ripple effects that deprive people of life and liberty
across federal substantive law, sentencing, collateral consequences, and even
immigration deportation. The federal criminal code alone incorporates state
law in over a dozen places,29 broadening the ever-imposing reach of the
federal government in an area traditionally left to the police power of the
states. Over the decades, these federal statutes have subjected tens of
thousands of people to unique dilemmas and punishments that challenge
notions of fairness, legitimacy, and efficiency in the criminal justice system.
The Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA) is one of the most visited examples
of statutory incorporation in federal criminal law because it provides a
digestible account of how statutory incorporation works in practice.30 The
ACA provides that any violation of state criminal law in a federal enclave
(such as a federal park) that is not already a federal crime will be punished as
a federal crime.31 The punishment for this federal violation is “a like
punishment” of the corresponding state law.32 While courts and commentators
have noted that this use of statutory incorporation is meant to respect state
law,33 it comes at the price of disrespecting the rights of individual

28 Id.; see also Wayne A. Logan, Creating a “Hydra in Government”: Federal Recourse to State Law
in Crime Fighting, 86 B.U. L. REV. 65, 93-94 (2006) [hereinafter Logan, Creating a Hydra in
Government] (describing what Divine calls “triggering” statutes as federal-centrism in the context
of federal sentencing statutes).
29 See, e.g., Divine, supra note 8, at 139-40 (summarizing other federal substantive criminal law
statutes); see also Evans, supra note 11, at 1780 n.45 (citing instances of statutory incorporation in the
federal criminal code).
30 See, e.g., Logan, Creating a Hydra in Government, supra note 28, at 71-75 (discussing contours
of the ACA and its incorporation of state substantive law); Divine, supra note 8, at 134-35 (same);
Dorf, supra note 23, at 111 (same); Larkin, supra note 22, at 372 n.141 (same).
31 18 U.S.C. § 13(a).
32 Id.
33 See United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286, 294 (1958) (“This procedure [laid out in the
ACA] is a practical accommodation of the mechanics of the legislative functions of State and Nation
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defendants. Professor Wayne Logan’s research on the ACA led him to believe
that it “creates significant disparities . . . . [b]y incorporating by reference
state substantive laws and sanctions . . . .”34 For example, the ACA allows the
federal government to prosecute and punish a Californian differently than it
would prosecute and punish a Texan under the same federal statute. The ACA
is illustrative of the inevitable design flaw of statutory incorporation when
practically applied amongst federal jurisdictions. It breeds nonuniformity and
disparities based on the vagaries of state law.35
Statutory incorporation is not just limited to the dozens of substantive
federal crimes that incorporate state law;36 it also enjoys a substantial impact
in federal sentencing statutes,37 collateral consequences,38 and even
immigration law. In the latter context, these differences in state law (big or
small) are the difference between remaining in the country or being deported.
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) incorporates state law in many
instances,39 but the most impactful statutory incorporation determines
deportability for noncitizens who have committed an “aggravated felony.”40
The term “aggravated felony” covers a broad scope of federal and state crimes,
such as murder, rape, and burglary,41 which leaves courts to sift through state
criminal elements to match with their corresponding federal definitions.42
in the field of police power where it is especially appropriate to make the federal regulation of local
conduct conform to that already established by the State.”).
34 Logan, Creating a Hydra in Government, supra note 28, at 74.
35 See United States v. Garcia, 893 F.2d 250, 253 (10th Cir. 1989) (observing that it is “not always
possible” to promote intrastate uniformity by means of the ACA while simultaneously preserving
interstate uniformity, and that the ACA represents a deliberate choice of the former goal).
36 See supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing the incorporation of state law into the
federal criminal code).
37 See Evans, supra note 11, at 1774-75, 1802 (discussing statutory incorporation in the Armed
Career Criminals Act (ACCA) and studying cases with large sentencing disparities based on
previous state criminal convictions); see also Rachel E. Barkow, Categorical Mistakes: The Flawed
Framework of the Armed Career Criminal Act and Mandatory Minimum Sentencing, 133 HARV. L. REV.
200, 208 (2019) [hereinafter Barkow, Categorical Mistakes] (“The complexity of the ACCA cases
. . .[stem] from Congress’s failure to wrestle with any of the tough questions that go along with
effectively deciding to turn state crimes into federal ones . . . .”).
38 See infra notes 78-89 (describing the incorporation of state law in areas of housing and social
security benefits).
39 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U) (determining eligibility for U-visa based upon victimhood
of potential state crimes); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(D) (defining vice crimes for excludability in part
under state law); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(E) (defining serious criminal activities in part under state
law); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) (defining terroristic activities in part under state law); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(4)(E)(ii) (defining exception to public charge rule in part under state law).
40 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43).
41 Id.
42 See, e.g., Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 190-91 (2013) (“When the Government alleges
that a state conviction qualifies as an ‘aggravated felony’ under the INA, we generally employ a
‘categorical approach’ to determine whether the state offense is comparable to an offense listed in
the INA.”).

354

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 170: 341

This approach yields disheartening disparities and has resulted in noncitizens
being treated differently for deportation purposes based on slight differences
in state law.43 And for one unlucky resident noncitizen,44 the difference
between staying in the United States with his family, friends, and the life he
had built came down to the placement of an “or” in a Pennsylvania statute,
whereas a noncitizen who committed a similar crime was not deported under
a nearly identical New Jersey statute that did not have the “or.”45
These types of disparities—the difference of several years behind bars or
being banished completely from your home and family—shock the conscience
when they are triggered by the difference of scrivener strokes in states’ laws.
Even those that defend statutory incorporation and the Court’s attempt to
interpret it in these criminal and immigration contexts have admitted that it
leads to disparate federal sentencing and immigration outcomes among
defendants who are otherwise similarly situated.46 Judges too have joined the
critique, calling these statutes confusing, complex, and incredibly taxing on
judicial economy.47 They have also recognized the moral dilemma when courts
are asked to “treat[ ] similarly situated [noncitizens] disparately” because of
the variation of state law.48

43 See Evans, supra note 11, at 1793-94, 1794 nn.149–158 (describing several deportation
disparities between similarly situated noncitizens based on differences of state law).
44 See Cazarez-Gutierrez v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 905, 917 (9th Cir. 2004) (characterizing the
defendant as having been “lucky enough” to commit a crime in a more lenient state that resulted in
less serious federal consequences).
45 See Evans, supra note 11, at 1792-93 (comparing cases of Wilson v. Aschcroft, 350 F.3d 377
(3d. Cir. 2003) (noncitizen convicted of New Jersey drug trafficking law was not deported because
conviction did not qualify as aggravated felony) with Garcia v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 462 F.3d 287
(3d. Cir. 2006) (noncitizen convicted of Pennsylvania drug trafficking law was deported because
conviction qualified as aggravated felony)).
46 See, e.g., Jennifer Lee Koh, The Whole Better than the Sum: A Case for the Categorical Approach
to Determining the Immigration Consequences of Crime, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257, 297 (2012)
(explaining that individuals who engage in similar criminal behavior may receive different
convictions in states with different statutory elements or record keeping practices); Rebecca
Sharpless, Finally, a True Elements Test: Mathis v. United States and the Categorical Approach, 82
BROOK. L. REV. 1275, 1278 (2017) (conceding the variation between state crimes gives prosecutors
options in charging crimes, which can result in disparities in immigration deportation).
47 See, e.g., United States v. Perez-Silvan, 861 F.3d 935, 944 (9th Cir. 2017) (Owens, J.,
concurring) (comparing sentencing jurisprudence under the ACCA to piecing archaeological puzzles
together “to locate the Well of the Souls”); Lopez-Valencia v. Lynch, 798 F.3d 863, 866 (9th Cir.
2015) (“[T]he task of figuring out whether a prior offense qualifies . . . under the [ACCA] or . . .
immigration law would seem to be a straightforward undertaking . . . . [H]owever, the classification
has been much more nuanced, and courts have spent inordinate amounts of time parsing whether a
crime falls into one of these categories.”).
48 Kahn v. INS, 36 F.3d 1412, 1414 (9th Cir. 1994); see also id. (“The INA was designed to
implement a uniform federal policy, and the meaning of concepts important to its application are
not to be determined according to the law of the forum, but rather require[ ] a uniform federal
definition.” (quotations omitted)); Aguirre v. INS, 79 F.3d 315, 317 (2d Cir. 1996) (expressing courts’
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This handful of examples of statutory incorporation in criminal law is but
a small sample in a much larger dynamic of statutory design; statutory
incorporation is wholly divorced from foundational goals of treating similar
people similarly. The notions of fairness and equal treatment in arenas such
as criminal liability, sentencing, immigration, and the many other areas
touched by criminal justice are bedrock principles that uphold the legitimacy
of these respective systems.49
B. Property Law
In addition to the effects that statutory incorporation has upon life and
liberty under criminal and immigration federal statutes, even more
Americans are affected by statutory incorporation’s broad application in
property law. In areas such as takings,50 bankruptcy,51 copyright,52 and tax,53
state law is the cornerstone that determines much of federal property rights.54
As property scholars have described, property rights simply do not exist
outside of state law.55 Thus, Congress has attempted to fashion its own
federal property rights regime by incorporating state law. As is the
predictable pattern, this produces a variation of federal property rights based
upon the variation of state laws.
Bankruptcy is one of the most illuminating examples of how statutory
incorporation affects federal property rights. Congress enacted the Bankruptcy
Code56 pursuant to its constitutional mandate to create “uniform Laws on the
“frequently expressed concern to avoid disparate treatment of similarly situated [noncitizens] under
the immigration laws” based on “the differences among state laws”).
49 See Logan, Creating a Hydra in Government, supra note 28, at 78 (discussing the
inconsistencies of statutory incorporation in criminal law and stating that they undermine “the
federal government’s commitment to fairness, predicated on uniform outcomes for similarly situated
defendants. . . .”); Evans, supra note 11, at 1800-03 (discussing the importance of a uniform
application of federal law to the perceived legitimacy of the legal system).
50 See U.S. CONST. amend. V. While constitutional incorporations of state law are outside the
scope of this Article, takings jurisprudence and scholarship nevertheless show further federal rights
that are determined by state law. See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalist Dimension of Regulatory
Takings Jurisprudence, 114 YALE L.J. 203, 206, 222 (2004) (arguing for state-specific takings clause in
federal jurisprudence since federal takings is largely dependent on state-law property laws).
51 See infra notes 56–77 and accompanying text.
52 See, e.g., De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 581 (1956) (using “the ready-made body of state
law to define the word ‘children’ in [the Copyright Act].”).
53 See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190, 197 (1971) (“[W]ith respect to community
income, as with respect to other income, federal income tax liability follows ownership . . . . In the
determination of ownership, state law controls.” (citations omitted)).
54 See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Federalism, 115 YALE L.J.
72, 74 (2005) (noting that states are the traditional source of property law).
55 See Melvyn R. Durchslag, Forgotten Federalism: The Takings Clause and Local Land Use
Decisions, 59 MD. L. REV. 464, 494 (2000).
56 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1501.
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subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.”57 Yet courts and
scholars agree that the Bankruptcy Code was not meant to create a federal
property regime, but only to create a uniform federal procedure to classify
existing state property rights between a debtor and their creditors.58 This is
evidenced by Congress’s uses of statutory incorporation in the Bankruptcy
Code, which are legion. Professor Thomas Plank has noted dozens of
incorporations throughout the Code,59 and consequently he and others have
recognized bankruptcy courts as the most frequent adjudicators of state law
among the federal judiciary.60
While federal bankruptcy rights vary according to the complexities of
state law determining everything from voidable preferences, secured and
unsecured debts, and constructive trusts,61 perhaps the most salient example
is that of property exemptions. Tens of thousands of individual debtors every
year make a difficult choice between filing a Chapter 7 or Chapter 13
bankruptcy.62 Whereas Chapter 7 bankruptcies require the debtor to liquidate
all nonexempt assets to pay back creditors, Chapter 13 strikes a different deal
and allows debtors to keep their property but requires them to pay back
creditors on a multi-year payment plan.63 This is where state law exemptions
come into play. Different states allow for different categories and amounts of
exemptions. For example, seven states such as Florida and Texas allow debtors
to exempt the entire value of their home in homestead exemptions,64 whereas
over twenty states by comparison allow meager homestead exemptions of
$20,000 or less.65 There is also wide variation among states regarding various
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
See Thomas E. Plank, Bankruptcy and Federalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1063, 1064-66 (2002)
(recognizing bankruptcy law’s role in adjusting relationship between debtor and creditor, which is
reliant on state property rights).
59 See id. at 1070-76 (describing all the ways that the federal bankruptcy code relies on
nonfederal and state law to determine bankruptcy outcomes).
60 See id. at 1076 (“[By] statutory command, federal courts must in many instances follow and
apply state law.”); see also Susan Block-Lieb, The Costs of a Non-Article III Bankruptcy Court System, 72
AM. BANKR. L.J. 529, 554 (1998) (noting the interstitial nature of bankruptcy law considering the
“contract, property, tort, secured transactions, [and] landlord-tenant . . . state laws” that frequently
come up in federal bankruptcy cases).
61 See, e.g., In re Unicom Comput. Corp., 13 F.3d 321, 325 (9th Cir. 1994) (acknowledging that
variations in state law determine whether property held by debtor in constructive trust is included
in bankruptcy holdings).
62 See Ed Flynn, Bankruptcy by the Numbers: Dead-on-Arrival Cases (at Bankruptcy Court), AM.
BANKR. INST. J., Jan. 2018, at 58, 82-83 (conducting a study on 240,751 Chapter 7 filings and 123,185
Chapter 13 filings over a six-year period).
63 See id. at 58 (explaining the difference between Chapter 7 and 13 bankruptcy cases).
64 See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.001 (2000) (providing unlimited homestead exemption);
see also FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a)(1) (same).
65 Raisa Bahchieva, Susan M. Wachter & Elizabeth Warren, Mortgage Debt, Bankruptcy, and the
Sustainability of Homeownership, in CREDIT MARKETS FOR THE POOR 73, 99 (Patrick Bolton &
57
58
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personal property exemptions such as automobiles, household goods, and
tools or other professional supplies.66 The Code also makes it harder to
liquidate property held in tenancies by the entirety, thus benefiting debtors
in states with such real estate holding options.67 Consequently, similar
debtors who live in different states may indeed choose different bankruptcy
options based on the amount of exemptions they can claim.68
These variations among state exemptions steer debtors into different
chapters of bankruptcy and produce impactful disparate outcomes. Whereas
Chapter 7 cases result in the successful discharge of debt over ninety-five
percent of the time, Chapter 13 filings have an abysmal thirty-three percent
success rate.69 This low rate of success usually results in Chapter 13 debtors—
most of whom choose this option to save their home70 perhaps because their
state did not have a robust homestead rule—end up losing their homes
anyway when the Chapter 13 repayment plan falls apart.71 This troubling
disparity gets worse when accounting for race. Professors Jean Braucher, Dov
Cohen, and Robert Lawless found that African Americans are more likely to
be steered into Chapter 13 payment plans72 even though the African American
community has a lower success rate due to multiple factors of financial
strain.73 Professor A. Mechele Dickerson has found the same, arguing that
Howard Rosenthal eds., 2005); see also Lawrence Ponoroff, Exemption Limitations: A Tale of Two
Solutions, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 221, 222 & n.8 (1997) (surveying state homestead exemptions).
66 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (allowing exemptions of a motor vehicle, household items, jewelry,
and professional tools and equipment, up to various value ceilings); see, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. X,
§ 4(a)(2) (exempting personal property up to $1,000); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 42.001-002
(2000) (allowing exemption of, inter alia, a motor vehicle for each family member, home furnishings,
jewelry, and livestock, up to a total of $60,000 for a family or $30,000 for a single adult).
67 See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1)(B). See also A. Mechele Dickerson, Family Values and the Bankruptcy
Code: A Proposal to Eliminate Bankruptcy Benefits Awarded on the Basis of Marital Status, 67 FORDHAM
L. REV. 69, 94 n.138 (1998) [hereinafter Dickerson, Family Values] (estimating as many as thirtyseven jurisdictions that allow married couples to shield property under tenancy of the entirety).
68 See Flynn, supra note 62, at 59, 82 (finding extreme disparities between states when recording
how many people choose to file different chapters of bankruptcy respective of the state they live in).
69 Katherine Porter, The Pretend Solution: An Empirical Study of Bankruptcy Outcomes, 90 TEX.
L. REV. 103, 107 (2011).
70 See id. at 135-37.
71 See, e.g., Michelle J. White & Ning Zhu, Saving Your Home in Chapter 13 Bankruptcy, 39 J. L.
STUD. 33, 37 (2010) (finding that ninety-six percent of Chapter 13 debtors are homeowners, but
many end up losing homes due to Chapter 13 failure).
72 See Jean Braucher, Dov Cohen & Robert M. Lawless, Race, Attorney Influence, and Bankruptcy
Chapter Choice, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 393, 406 (2012) (“[A]ttorneys recommended Chapter
13 more frequently to a hypothetical couple when there were cues that the couple was African
American vs. white.”).
73 See Rory Van Loo, A Tale of Two Debtors: Bankruptcy Disparities by Race, 72 ALB. L. REV. 231,
234 (2009) (reporting a 19.8% success rate for African Americans compared to a 28.3% success rate
for Caucasians in Chapter 13 debt discharge); see also Braucher et al., supra note 72, at 405 (finding
that 36.2% of Chapter 13 cases filed by African Americans fail during the first ten to fourteen months
after filing, compared to only 25.5% for other groups).
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these Chapter 13 racial disparities favor white debtors because of the wealth
gap between white and African American debtors.74
For over a century, courts and scholars have recorded and struggled with
the moral and economic fallout produced when statutory incorporation leads
to disparate federal property outcomes based on the variations of state law.75
These pains are felt across the federal property landscape, of which bankruptcy
is the most salient example.76 Not only does this mean that identically situated
property holders can have drastically different outcomes based on the state of
their domicile, but also that debtors from vulnerable and underrepresented
communities may be disproportionately impacted due to bankruptcy laws that
were designed with white middle-class debtors in mind.77 In this property
context, statutory incorporation continues its pattern of creating moral and
economic dilemmas that require significantly high justifications for the
detrimental costs it has imposed.
C. Federal Benefits
Congress has also used its powers to limit various federal benefits by
incorporating state law. There are many examples where Congress has used
prior criminal activity or convictions under state law to bar eligibility for
federal programs. Federal housing programs, for instance, are impacted by the
infamous “One-Strike” rule where involvement in drug or other violent state
crimes renders applicants ineligible for needed housing subsidies.78 The OneStrike rule also renders applicants for federal welfare and other incomeassistance programs ineligible for the very assistance they might need to
74 A. Mechele Dickerson, Race Matters in Bankruptcy, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1725, 1726-27
(2004) [hereinafter Dickerson, Race Matters in Bankruptcy]. For a discussion on disparities for
LGBTQ debtors, see Dickerson, Family Values, supra note 67, at 92.
75 See, e.g., Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 613 (1918) (acknowledging that federal
recognition of different state laws on property rights could “lead to different [bankruptcy] results in
different States.”); Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Persistence
of Local Legal Culture: Twenty Years of Evidence from the Federal Bankruptcy Courts, 17 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 801, 809-10 (1994) (outlining the existence of exemptions under state law that create
variation in bankruptcy outcomes).
76 See supra notes 56–60.
77 See Dickerson, Race Matters in Bankruptcy, supra note 74, at 1726 (arguing that Congress
designed bankruptcy laws to favor white middle-class homeowners by allowing more favorable
discharge and exemption rules for debt that applies more often to their demographic and wealth
profile).
78 See Barkow, Categorical Mistakes, supra note 37, at 214 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 13661(c) (2012)) (stating that
Congress passed legislation allowing public housing authorities to decline providing housing subsidies to
anyone involved in drug-related or other violent criminal activity); see also HUD Announces “One Strike” Rules
for Public Housing Tenants, NAT’L DRUG STRATEGY NETWORK (May 1996), https://www.ndsn.org/
may96/onestrik.html [https://perma.cc/SKA9-HW5R] (characterizing collateral consequences as “OneStrike” rules).
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successfully reintegrate into society.79 Even those convicted of state drug
crimes are barred from receiving federal student loans for certain periods of
time.80
Disparities between state laws also arise in the Social Security Act.81
Similar to other welfare programs, applicants have a burden of proof to
qualify for such benefits, such as proving disability or family status. For
instance, the Act gives survival benefits to a “widow,” “child,” “wife,”
“husband,” or people who are “married” if their qualifying family members
pass away.82 But Congress made the decision to define these terms by
incorporating the state law of the applicant’s domicile instead of developing
federal definitions to avoid “entanglement in the traditional state law realm
of family relations.”83 Consequently, life altering benefits that are often
sought by poorer applicants in need of assistance are determined by state legal
definitions.
The pattern of statutory incorporation continues to have discriminatory
impacts in this area. As an example, whether a child receives social security
survival benefits from their deceased parents turns on the intestacy,
inheritance, and time limits of state law.84 Biological children born through
the advances of in vitro technology within three years of a parent’s death
could receive such benefits in Louisiana, but not in California or Iowa because
of their two-year cutoff.85 In 1965, when many amendments to the Act were
being debated in Congress, a Senate Report explicitly recognized this
problematic framework: many children would be denied important benefits
because of the different preferences states had when defining the rights of
children born outside of a marriage.86 Courts have come to embrace this

See Barkow, Categorical Mistakes, supra note 37, at 214 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 862(a) (2012)).
See id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1091(r)(1)).
42 U.S.C. §§ 401–34.
See 42 U.S.C. § 416 (b), (c), (e), (f), (g), (h).
Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 566 U.S 541, 554 (2012); see also Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d
49, 62 (4th Cir. 2011) (calling reliance on state law in this context an “advantage” due to “states’
historic competence”).
84 See Capato, 566 U.S. at 544-55.
85 Compare LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:391.1(A) (2021) (child born within three years of parent’s death
can inherit benefits), with CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5(c) (West 2021) (allowing inheritance if child
is in utero within two years of parent’s death), and IOWA CODE § 633.220A(1) (2021) (child born
within two years of parent’s death can inherit benefits).
86 See S. REP. NO. 89–404, at 109-10 (1965), as reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943, 2049-50
(“[I]n several States a child whose parents never married cannot inherit his father’s intestate
property under any circumstances.”); Schafer, 641 F.3d at 57-58 (noting Congress’s acknowledgement
of the disparate treatment of similarly situated children when those born “out-of-wedlock” could not
be granted inheritance rights).
79
80
81
82
83
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disparate treatment, not only deeming it constitutional,87 but also presuming
Congress meant these state-by-state disparities as “the most advisable
method” to determine familial relationships.88 In these circumstances, a child
has no choice when to be born, where to be born, or to whom to be born.
Nevertheless, courts believe that Congress deemed it appropriate to treat
child beneficiaries differently based on these factors over which these children
have no control. This example of the treatment of child beneficiaries is one
of many in which the importance of being a “husband,” “wife,” “child,” or
“married”89 has large implications as determined by the variations of state law.
D. Federal Liability
In addition to the federal benefits granted by statute, Congress has also
conceded federal liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).90
Specifically, Congress used statutory incorporation to determine federal
liability when a federal official or employee “would be liable to the claimant
in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.”91
As the familiar pattern dictates, however, this triumph of government
accountability92 varies in morally problematic ways due to the variability of

87 See, e.g., Lee v. Astrue, Civ. No. 10-125-GFVT, 2012 WL 912733, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 15,
2012) (holding that the Social Security Act’s deference to state law on the definition of marriage
satisfies rational basis review).
88 See Jones v. Schweiker, 668 F.2d 755, 763 (4th Cir. 1981) (Bryan, J., dissenting) (finding that
Congress concluded that reliance on state laws of intestacy succession was the most appropriate
method for determining who was a child for purposes of receiving certain Social Security benefits),
vacated sub nom. Jones v. Heckler, 460 U.S. 1077 (1983).
89 In the pre-Windsor era, Social Security and many other federal benefits available to married
couples also hinged on state law, and whether a state recognized common-law marriage or gay
marriage. See Gill v. Off. of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 391 n.126 (D. Mass. 2010)
(“[R]ecognizing that whether an individual is ‘married’ is, for purposes of the tax laws, to be
determined by the law of the State of the marital domicile.” (quoting Dunn v. Comm’r of Internal
Revenue, 70 T.C. 361, 366 (1978)); 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(A)(i) (defining an applicant for purposes
of Social Security survivor and death benefits as “the wife, husband, widow, or widower [of an
insured person] . . . if the courts of the State [of the deceased’s domicile] . . . would find that such
applicant and such insured individual were validly married . . . .”); 38 U.S.C. § 103(c) (stating that,
for purposes of determining whether a person is a widow or widower of a veteran and therefore
eligible for certain benefits, either the law of the state where the parties resided during the marriage
or the law of the state lived in when the right to benefits accrued shall be relied on).
90 See Seth P. Waxman & Trevor W. Morrison, What Kind of Immunity? Federal Officers, State
Criminal Law, and the Supremacy Clause, 112 YALE L.J. 2195, 2243 (2003) (stating that the FTCA,
and other vehicles of “state regulation of the federal government [are creatures] of congressional
consent . . . .”).
91 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).
92 The FTCA is an exception of the typically immune United States government. Cf. Erwin
Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1201-02 (2001) (“[Sovereign
immunity is] an anachronistic relic and the entire doctrine should be eliminated from American
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state law. And although the American Law Institute has compiled
authoritative restatements of tort law over the generations that synthesize
trends and majority rules among the states,93 there are still significant
differences.94
Courts have noted the inherent uniformity problems posed by the FTCA
and the disparate results based on where a federal official may commit the
tort.95 This means the federal government can get away with tortious actions
in certain jurisdictions, limiting liability according to a cost–benefit analysis
that is common in tort law.96 In many cases, this would not be a problem
because federal officials and employees are often domiciled, and conduct their
duties, in only one state. This might justify holding that federal official
accountable under that state’s law. However, for certain plaintiffs, this may
not be ideal.
Feres v. United States97 is an instructive case wherein the plaintiffs were
soldiers who sustained injuries because of the negligence of other military
employees.98 The Court deemed it fair that a normal plaintiff’s recovery
“should be governed by the law of the location where he has elected to be,”
but noted this is not the case with soldiers who have “no such choice and must
serve . . . any number of places in quick succession” in the states or territories
of the United States.99 Given the “divergencies [that] are notorious” in state
tort law, the Court in dicta stated “[t]hat the geography of an injury should
select the law to be applied to [a soldier’s] tort claims makes no sense.”100
Similar logic was contemplated in United States v. Muniz, where federal
prisoners brought suit alleging that they sustained injuries due to the
negligence of the prison staff.101 In Muniz, while the Court acknowledged that
prisoners do not have control over where they serve their sentence, it still

law” because it undermines “the fundamental recognition that the government and government
officials can do wrong and must be held accountable.”).
93 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (AM. L. INST. 1979).
94 See Ulrich Magnus, Why is US Tort Law so Different?, 1 J. EUR. TORT L. 102, 103-04 (2010)
(recognizing wide differences in certain areas of tort law by state).
95 See Ducey v. United States, 713 F.2d 504, 517 (9th Cir. 1983) (Skopil, J., concurring) (“[Since]
sovereign immunity depends on application of state law . . . FTCA claims . . . will thus continue to
yield the disparate results shown in the cases surveyed in our opinion.”).
96 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 179-83 (5th ed. 1998)
(discussing the “Learned Hand formula,” where cost–benefit analysis is conducted by parties to
determine efficient duties of care to maximize social welfare).
97 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
98 Id. at 136-37 (explaining that one soldier was killed in a fire in their barracks caused by
negligence, another sustained injury when an army doctor negligently left a towel in their abdomen
during a procedure, and another died because of negligent treatment by army surgeons).
99 Id. at 143.
100 Id. at 142-43.
101 374 U.S. 150, 150-52 (1963).
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held that applying different state laws to the plaintiffs would not prejudice
them.102 Rather, the Court balanced this risk of nonuniformity with the even
heavier prejudice if the prisoners were not allowed to recover at all.103
The cases of soldiers and prisoners present a morally ambiguous
consideration not yet highlighted in the other areas of law. Should an
individual’s rights depend on what state they live in if they have little to
no choice in their domicile? Soldiers follow deployment orders and must
live on certain military bases for long periods of time. While federal
prisoners have forfeited many of their liberties, they at least have rights to
be treated humanely and be free from tortious actions against them. They
do not have the freedom to choose what state to live in with all of the costs
and benefits of that state’s laws. These issues of statutory incorporation
raise important problems like these that challenge our notions of fairness,
equality, and the role of the federal government in areas of the law that
borrow from state preferences.
E. Sacrificing Uniformity, Legitimacy, and Efficiency
The pattern is plain. Across the diverse subject matters of statutory
incorporation, scholars and judges have observed striking disparities based
upon the irrelevant moral and economic reality of what state a person
happens to call home. Person A who lives in Jurisdiction A enjoys different
federal rights, benefits, and accountabilities than Person B who lives in
Jurisdiction B. But this reality begs the following question: why is this such a
problem? What is so wrong with the federal government treating people
differently according to the state in which they live? This Section outlines
three considerations that borrow from and summarize the realities highlighted
in this Part.
First, there is the problem of conflicting presumptions. The Court has
been clear that “when Congress enacts a statute[,] . . . it does not intend to
make its application dependent on state law . . . . because the application of
federal legislation is nationwide.”104 Yet the Court seems to abandon this
presumption of federal uniformity when Congress has employed statutory
Id. at 162.
Id. at 161-62.
Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 119 (1983) (quoting NLRB v. Nat. Gas
Util. Dist., 402 U.S. 600, 603 (1971)); see also Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 104 (1943)
(“Congress when it enacts a statute is not making the application of the federal act dependent on
state law.”); Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 43 (1989) (starting with the
general assumption that the legislature does not intend for a statutory term of a federal act to be
given content by the application of state law); Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 588, 590 (1990)
(stating that federal sentencing enhancement should not rely on the different “technical definitions
and labels” or the “vagaries of state law”).
102
103
104
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incorporation; once again, this presumes Congress enacted these laws with
the intent that they would produce disparate federal outcomes based on the
variations of state law.105 Statutory incorporation seems to be an exception
that swallows the otherwise useful rule of federal uniformity,106 specifically
negating issues of fairness and legitimacy that comes when similarly situated
people are treated differently by the same federal government across its wide
jurisdiction.107
This leads to the second consideration, that treating similarly situated
people differently based on the attribute of state domicile cannot be
reconciled with notions of fairness and legitimacy. As the author has noted in
the criminal justice and immigration contexts, treating similar cases similarly
are bedrock principles that uphold the legitimacy of these respective
systems.108 And while perfect uniformity is nearly impossible to achieve since
different judges, attorneys, and a bevy of other factors can lead to materially
different outcomes in the application of the law,109 these human-based
disparities are widely accepted as acceptable (but not ideal) results of the
imperfect administration of law.
Treating people differently based on where they live, however, is
materially different from the human-based disparities because the former can
105 See, e.g., Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 50 (1979) (holding that Congress intended for
the Travel Act to punish state criminal acts “in order to reinforce state law enforcement.”); Gluck,
Our [National] Federalism, supra note 16, at 2021 (arguing that Congress intends to build diversity
into federal statutes by incorporating state law).
106 See Gluck, Our [National] Federalism, supra note 16, at 2020 (acknowledging that “[i]t may
well be that uniformity is the value most often associated with nationalism,” but that such a goal was
no longer a useful concept).
107 See Cristina M. Rodríguez, Uniformity and Integrity in Immigration Law: Lessons from the
Decisions of Justice (and Judge) Sotomayor, 123 YALE L.J.F. 499, 503-04 (2014) (acknowledging that
statutory incorporation design thwarts uniformity, but nevertheless the same rules can still be
uniformly applied); Evans, supra note 11, at 1799-1808 (acknowledging different theories of
uniformity in federal law).
108 Evans, supra note 11, at 1803; accord Logan, Creating a Hydra in Government, supra note 28, at
83, 104 (same); see also Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1570 (2008) (noting
how some scholars argue that without uniformity in the law, “the legitimacy of the federal court system
and the integrity of federal law are undermined” and “predictability would suffer . . . .”).
109 See, e.g., Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing: No End to Disparity, 28 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 161, 175-208 (1991) (statistically analyzing all relevant sentencing variables and
finding that the distribution of average sentences varied from district to district); SUBSTANTIAL
ASSISTANCE STAFF WORKING GRP., U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, Federal Court Practices: Sentence
Reductions Based on Defendants’ Substantial Assistance to the Government, 11 FED. SENT’G REP. 18, 25
(1998) (observing widely varied substantial assistance practices in eight different districts based on
interviews of judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and probation officers); see also Frost, supra note
108, at 1606 (arguing that the detriments of nationwide non-uniformity of federal law are overstated,
and that a regional patchwork of federal law has benefits); Michael M. O’Hear, The Original Intent
of Uniformity in Federal Sentencing, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 749, 753-56 (2006) (tracing eight different
questions about uniformity that reformers in criminal sentencing have had to confront, illustrating
the different goals of various theories of uniformity).
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be controlled and mitigated. From a moral point of view, people can and
should be treated similarly by the same sovereign unless there is some
relevant attribute that justifies different treatment. Many might argue that
people have a moral responsibility to adhere to the laws of their jurisdiction,
especially since they have the power to vote with their feet and move to other
jurisdictions that better accommodate their preferences.110 But this ignores
that moving is a privilege available to few in the upper classes of society that
have career mobility, resources to move, and fewer dependents that will not
complicate the relocation.111 For example, consider the average bankruptcy
debtor; these middle- to lower-class debtors112 likely do not have the type of
resources to move or otherwise engage in strategic estate planning to take
advantage of state property and tax laws. Indeed, their situation is the
opposite, which is why they seek relief in bankruptcy. The same can be said
for the very people relying on social security or suing the federal government
when they suffer from injurious torts. The average American does not have
enough cash to cover a $500 emergency,113 much less develop the legal
expertise to differentiate between state laws before forum shopping with their
feet to maximize their preferences.114 Academic assumptions that most people
will migrate to maximize the benefits of state law are divorced from reality.
Thus, to treat people differently based on the false narrative that they can
vote with their feet lacks credulity.
Third, statutory incorporation has produced its share of confusion and
criticism from the judiciary, taxing judicial economy as a result. Even scholars
defending statutory incorporation have admitted that it might further
See infra notes 152–154 and accompanying text.
See Chris Pope, Degenerate Federalism, NAT’L REV. (May 10, 2018, 11:00 AM),
https://www.nationalreview.com/magazine/2018/05/28/amazon-hq2-cities-shifting-cost-federalgovernment [https://perma.cc/6NV7-8AEQ] (critiquing theory of voting with one’s feet because it
assumes that people can readily move, which discounts the degree to which people are tied to certain
jurisdictions because of “employment, family ties, homeownership, or other personal attachments . . . .”).
112 See Braucher et al., supra note 72, at 401 (finding that median monthly income of bankruptcy
debtors with one dependent was $2,267); Scott F. Norberg & Andrew Velkey, Debtor Discharge and
Creditor Repayment in Chapter 13, 39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 473, 487 (2006) (finding that the average
debtor’s income was less than half the mean household income in the United States).
113 See Aimee Picchi, A $500 Surprise Expense Would Put Most Americans Into Debt, CBS NEWS (Jan.
12, 2017, 11:39 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/most-americans-cant-afford-a-500-emergencyexpense [https://perma.cc/9FFY-5U8S] https://www.cbsnews.com/news/most-americans-cant-afford-a500-emergency-expense; Jill Cornfield, Bankrate Survey: Just 4 in 10 Americans Have Savings They’d Rely
on in an Emergency, BANKRATE (Jan. 12, 2017), https://www.bankrate.com/finance/consumerindex/money-pulse-0117.aspx [https://perma.cc/5PTC-8JH4] (surveying over one thousand Americans,
only forty-one percent of which could cover unexpected emergency expenses from their savings).
114 See Scott A. Wolla & Jessica Sullivan, Education, Income, and Wealth, E CON . R SCH .
F. R ES . B ANK . S T . L OUIS (Jan. 2017), https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/page1econ/2017/01/03/education-income-and-wealth [https://perma.cc/XTK7-LCTV] (detailing
the relationship between median income and education level).
110
111
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“obscure the content of law and lead to confusion, if for example citizens are
led to confuse one jurisdiction’s laws with another’s.”115 Others have lamented
that what seems to be a simple concept of incorporating a state’s law can
become an Alice in Wonderland “looking glass, on close examination . . .
prov[ing] to be quite a bit more complicated.”116 Several judges have
commented on the drain such doctrinal confusion has caused in the criminal
and immigration fields,117 one going as far as saying it has become the most
judicially taxing issue in the entire federal judiciary.118 Navigating statutory
incorporation has become “an arduous task” for judges by their own
assessment,119 illustrating the negativity some jurists have felt towards the
problems highlighted above.
II. INCOMPLETE THEORIES OF INCORPORATION
Given statutory incorporation’s shortcomings across so many different
areas of federal law, it is curious why Congress continues to employ the
practice. Divining congressional intent is never easy,120 but scholars have
nevertheless made meaningful contributions studying the unique statutory
relationship between Congress and state legislatures that seemingly manifests
as a mirage of federalism or delegations of lawmaking authority. This Part
investigates these theoretical claims to determine if statutory incorporation
delivers on the benefits of federalism and delegation, which are in some ways
two sides of the same coin of diffusing power to other political actors.
Ultimately, the theoretical justifications of federalism- and delegationbased statutory incorporation cannot withstand scrutiny. The one-way
unilateral transfer of power in Congress’s incorporation of state law cannot
fit into modern notions of federalism and similarly fails to comport with how
Congress has traditionally delegated power to agencies and other government
officials. Indeed, these are fictions that courts and scholars have fashioned to
make sense of a phenomena that so many have struggled to understand.121
See Rossi, supra note 26, at 466.
See Boyd, supra note 24, at 1203.
See, e.g., Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 150 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring) (describing
ACCA doctrine as “piecemeal, suspenseful, [and] Scrabble-like . . . .”); Lopez-Valencia v. Lynch, 798
F.3d 863, 866 (9th Cir. 2015) (describing the “inordinate amount[] of time” spent by courts
determining whether a prior state court conviction qualifies as an “aggravated felony” under
immigration law).
118 See United States v. Aguila-Montes de Oca, 655 F.3d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[O]ver the
past decade, perhaps no other area of the law has demanded more of our resources.”), abrogated by
Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013).
119 De Lima v. Sessions, 867 F.3d 260, 268 (1st Cir. 2017).
120 See John F. Manning, Inside Congress’s Mind, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1952 (2015) (“[T]he
more we know, the more we understand how hard it is to identify congressional intent.”).
121 See infra subsection Part II.A.3.
115
116
117
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Thus, instead of holding Congress accountable for the troubling disparities
and inefficiencies caused by statutory incorporation, apologists have instead
used formalistic ivory-tower theories to justify an ill-conceived statutory
design with the veneers of federalism and delegation. Understanding the
value and the shortcomings of these legal fictions is an important step to fully
investigate not only the practical difficulties caused by statutory incorporation
explored in Part I, but also the theoretical difficulties and solutions discussed
in this Part and continued in Part III.
A. Federalism-Based Incorporation
Federalism has served as an important theoretical backdrop in many
discussions of statutory incorporation because of the heavy reliance Congress
places on state law. The impactful link whereby federal outcomes become
dependent on state law implicates a power dynamic between Congress and the
legislatures of the states.
The federalism literature is quite voluminous, with theory and debate
giving forum to dozens of different theories and concepts.122 The goal of this
Section is appropriately tailored for the task of examining how traditional
and contemporary theories of federalism serve to justify statutory incorporation,
if at all. This Section argues that these theories and practices of federalism
cannot fully explain or justify statutory incorporation because it creates a oneway, unilateral federal-to-state relationship. When Congress incorporates state
law into a federal statute, it does so without the consultation, negotiation, or
any input from the states.123 The states, for their part, do not respond in any
meaningful way. There is no give and take or exercise of power between the
federal and state governments that is characteristic of modern federalism.124 If
statutory incorporation is to be considered as a form of federalism,125 it should
be considered as the weakest form that carries with it the least amount of

122 For an excellent introduction to this vast literature, see Bridget Fahey, Federalism by
Contract, 129 YALE L.J. 2326, 2334 nn.14–15 (2020).
123 See City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 579, 632 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (“The federal
government’s choice to pursue deportation on the basis of local criminal justice outcomes is
something that cities and localities have no control over and presumably no input in.”).
124 See infra notes 163–168 and accompanying text.
125 Compare Gluck, Our [National] Federalism, supra note 16, at 1997-98 (arguing that state
implementation of federal law and incorporation of state law within federal statutory schemes
promotes the goals of federalism), with MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM:
POLITICAL IDENTITY AND TRAGIC COMPROMISE 20-29 (2008) (describing state implementation
of federal law as “decentralization”), and Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes
on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 911 (1994) (stating that federalism is a structuring
principle, not a theory to explain managerial decision-making by the federal government that
“decentralization” describes).
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federalism benefits due to its anemic federal-to-state relationship.126 Thus,
federalism is an unsatisfying theoretical justification for statutory
incorporation and should instead fall within the realm of legal fiction
divorced from the actual realities of how Congress thinks about and drafts
incorporative statutes.
1. Traditional Federalism
The traditional study of federalism has identified four primary benefits
from the balancing and negotiation between federal and sub-federal loci of
power.127 First, diffusing power can protect individual liberties from being
trampled by over-powerful government actors.128 Second, giving power to
state and local actors increases political engagement of the citizenry.129
Third, states can experiment with different policies as laboratories of
democracy.130 And fourth, states are incentivized through competition with
each other to innovate policies that will attract political and economic
power.131 Unfortunately, statutory incorporation accomplishes few of these
stated goals.
When it comes to protecting individual liberties from domineering
government power, statutory incorporation is left wanting. Federalism
recognizes that an unbalanced accumulation of power by federal or state
governments often results in the trampling of individual liberties.132 These
lessons are especially important in the very areas that statutory incorporation
governs—such as federal criminal and property law—since those rights form
126 See, e.g., Wayne A. Logan, Criminal Justice Federalism and National Sex Offender Policy, 6
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 51, 88-107 (2008) [hereinafter Logan, Criminal Justice Federalism] (arguing that
federal sex offender registry statutes often subvert the traditional goals of federalism).
127 For a brief list of scholars outlining these traditional benefits of federalism, see Erwin
Chemerinsky, Empowering States When It Matters: A Different Approach to Preemption, 69 BROOK. L.
REV. 1313, 1324-25 (2004); Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 389-405 (1997);
and David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2551-60 (2005).
128 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 (1996) (“This separation of the two spheres
is one of the Constitution’s structural protections of liberty.”).
129 See DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 91 (1995) (“[O]ne of the stronger
arguments for a decentralized political structure is that, to the extent the electorate is small, and
elected representatives are thus more immediately accountable to individuals and their concerns,
government is brought closer to the people . . . .”).
130 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1990) (“[Federalism] allows for more innovation
and experimentation in government . . . .”).
131 Id. (“[Federalism] makes government more responsive by putting the States in competition
for a mobile citizenry.”).
132 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (“[T]he Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty . . . .”); SHAPIRO, supra
note 129, at 52-56 (noting the cases of slavery, Jim Crow, segregation, and criminal procedure as
times when the federal government lead the way in protecting individual rights from state
preferences to discriminate).
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the basis of the American social contract and are often subject to the most
dangerous abuses of power.133 However, statutory incorporation does not
fulfill this traditional goal of federalism. While it ensures that federal
outcomes respect and defer to state law, it does very little to mitigate abuses
of power. Statutory incorporation requires the federal government to take
state law into account, but there is no active check against the federal
government’s exercise of these powers. Instead, the federal government can
continue to convict, sentence, and deport people as it pleases. State law is
merely a box that federal actors must check, and not a check that protects
people from these federal actors. Thousands of people have been affected by
federal sentencing enhancements, and hundreds of thousands have been
deported under the statutory incorporation of immigration law.134 This is a
far cry from states using their sovereignty to balance power to protect
individual liberties from a powerful federal government.
Federalism also carries the benefit of increasing citizens’ political
engagement. Giving power to local and state politics increases the investment
that individuals make, since they can meaningfully influence their government
at multiple levels.135 Proponents of statutory incorporation argue that it
empowers state law because it allows Congress to impactfully assist state and
local officials by basing federal outcomes on state laws tailored to those
jurisdictions.136 But there is no evidence to suggest that this actually increases
civic engagement at the state or local level.137 While it is difficult to measure
civic engagement, a brief survey of state burglary and tax statutes offers a
useful look.
The interpretation of “burglary” is a commonly litigated term in statutory
incorporation, having reached the Supreme Court over half a dozen times in
the past thirty years.138 As a result, one might expect statutory
133 See Charles Hobson, Atkins v. Virginia, Federalism, and Judicial Review, 11 WIDENER L.
REV. 23, 23-24 (2004) (arguing that the Supreme Court should treat punishment—which is a
necessary part of the criminal justice system—with extra care).
134 See Evans, supra note 11, at 1773 n.12 (detailing the many thousands of people every year
affected negatively by statutory incorporation in criminal sentencing and immigration laws).
135 See SHAPIRO, supra note 129, at 92 (arguing that small town meetings are the “ultimate form
of democracy” because the entire community “is eligible to consider, debate, and vote on substantive
matters,” and elected representatives take on a managerial role); see also Heather K. Gerken,
Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 22-25 (2010) (arguing that localism scholars
should respect the power and importance of sub-local institutions within the federalism structure).
136 See Divine, supra note 8, at 182-83 (arguing that the federalization of criminal law is meant
to assist states since the federal government has no interest in local crime).
137 See infra notes 143–145 and accompanying text.
138 See Quarles v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1872, 1876 (2019) (“The question here is how to
define ‘burglary’ under § 924(e).”); United States v. Stitt, 139 S. Ct. 399, 403-04 (2018) (“[T]he
question here is whether the statutory term ‘burglary’ includes burglary of a structure or vehicle
that has been adapted or is customarily used for overnight accommodation.”); Mathis v. United
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incorporation—touted as a triumph of federalism that increases civic
engagement—to empower states to update their burglary laws to maximize
the synergy between federal assistance and state criminal law. Yet of all the
fifty states, only a little more than half have updated their burglary statutes
in the past decade.139 This inaction stands in stark contrast to state tax
statutes, which are also important subjects of statutory incorporation.140
Nearly every state updated their tax laws in 2019,141 which seems to be part of
a perennial pattern that states take part in to maximize tax revenues.
States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2257 (2016) (“Because the elements of Iowa’s burglary law are broader than
those of generic burglary, [the defendant’s] convictions under that law cannot give rise to an ACCA
sentence.”); Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 277 (2013) (“Because generic unlawful entry
is not an element . . . of § 459, a conviction under that statute is never for generic burglary.”); James
v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 195 (2007) (“The question before us is whether attempted burglary,
as defined by Florida law, is a ‘violent felony’ under the ACCA.”); Shepard v. United States, 544
U.S. 13, 16 (2005) (“The question here is whether a sentencing court can look to police reports or
complaint applications to determine whether an earlier guilty plea necessarily admitted, and
supported a conviction for, generic burglary.”); Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 577-78 (1990)
(“[W]e are called upon to determine the meaning of the word ‘burglary’ as it is used in § 1402 of
Subtitle I . . . of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 . . . .”).
139 A survey of state burglary laws as of the publishing of this Article shows that only 29 states
(including states like Alabama, Louisiana, Texas, and West Virginia) have updated at least one of
their many burglary statutes in the past ten years. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-7-7 (2015); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 5-39-101 (2017); CAL. PENAL CODE § 463 (2018); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-4-203 (2018);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 825 (2019); FLA. STAT. § 810.011 (2020); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-7-1 (2017);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 708-817 (2014); IDAHO CODE § 18-1401 (2021); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/19-1
(2018); IND. CODE § 35-43-2-1 (2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5807 (2017); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:62
(2020); ME. STAT. tit. 17, § 401 (2019); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 6-202 (2014); MO. REV.
STAT. § 569.160 (2017); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-507 (2015); NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.060 (2020); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 635:1 (2014); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2C:18-1 (2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-54 (2013);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2911.12 (2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1435 (2018); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 164.205 (2015); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3502 (2016); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.01 (2017); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1201 (2013); W. VA. CODE § 61-3-11 (2018); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-3-301 (2013).
140 See supra note 53.
141 A similar survey to that in note 139 of the hundreds of state tax statutes revealed that at
least one (often dozens) such statute in each state was modified or updated in 2019 or 2018, showing
a keen sensitivity that each state has in updating tax statutes to maximize tax revenues. See, e.g.,
ALA. CODE § 40-12-307 (2019); ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.048 (2019); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 426011 (2019); ARK. CODE § 26-36-315 (2019); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 41017 (2019); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 39-22-535 (2019); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-39v (2019); DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 30 § 5171
(2019); FLA. STAT. § 215.86 (2019); GA. CODE ANN. § 48-7-105 (2019); HAW. REV. STAT. § 23564.2 (2019); IDAHO CODE § 63-602EE (2020); 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 750/1-15 (2018); IND. CODE
§ 6-2.5-15-4 (2019); IOWA CODE § 433.4A (2019); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-2925c (2021); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 131.250 (2020); LA. STAT. ANN. § 1695 (2019); ME. STAT. tit. 36, § 5190 (2019); MD.
CODE ANN. TAX-GEN. § 11-705 (West 2019); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 64G, § 3D (2019); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 207.778 (2020); MINN. STAT. § 290.993 (2018); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 27-7-823
(2019); MO. REV. STAT. § 140.987 (2019); MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-68-510 (2019); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 77-2773 (2019); NEV. REV. STAT. § 372A.250 (2020); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78-E:7 (2019); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 54:50-46 (2019); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-41-2 (2019); N.Y. TAX LAW § 1185 (2019);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-113.35A (2019); N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-39.2-04.14 (2019); OHIO REV.
CODE. ANN. § 5727.75 (2021); OKLA. STAT., tit. 68, § 2395 (2021); OR. REV. STAT. § 317A.131
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If the narrative of civic engagement were true, one might expect that state
and local governments would frequently update impactful state laws that
would in turn shape federal policy. Admittedly, tracking changes in state
legislative action is an imperfect way to measure civic engagement in local
and state politics.142 However, it does offer some value to illustrate that state
legislatures seem somewhat indifferent to the role they play in the statutory
incorporation scheme. Alternatively, states may like their burglary statutes
and see no need to change them in order to take advantage of their power
under statutory incorporation. Inaction can be a sign of civic engagement,
but this theory is much less persuasive.143 It is more likely that state inaction
on burglary statutes and robust involvement with tax statutes highlight an
indifference. State and local officials, as well as their constituents, are often
concerned with state and local problems, which differ from the type of civic
engagement that would increase interest in federal goals.144 These state and
local actors will continue to pass laws that are beneficial to their constituents
regardless of statutory incorporation, and there seems to be no increase in civic
engagement because of it.145 For this reason, burglary statutes can change or
remain the same according to the preferences of state and local actors, not
because of statutory incorporation. Likewise, tax statutes will continue to be
updated because of the benefits these updates have for state and local
revenues, notwithstanding any regard for the statutory incorporation regime.
To defenders of statutory incorporation, these frequent updates could be
characterized as a victory of dynamic incorporation since they ensure that
federal law will always update with changing state preferences.146 But
dynamic incorporation has no bearing on the goals of federalism; there is no
evidence that statutory incorporation increases state and local civic
(2020); PA. CONS. STAT. § 1701-K (2019); R.I. GEN. Laws 44 § 44-5-10.1 (2019); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 12-37-2615 (2019); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 10-45-113 (2019); TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-5-1332
(2019); TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.0045 (2019); UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-7-624 (2021); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 32, § 7477 (2019); VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3947 (2019); WASH. REV. CODE § 82.16.310
(2019); W. VA. CODE § 11-13EE-8 (2020); WIS. STAT. § 77.707 (2019); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 39-18101 (2020).
142 Other ways to track civic engagement might include voter registration, voting participation,
attendance at local government body meetings, and other ways that constituents show their
interaction with the political system.
143 For example, if citizens and their representatives engage with their state burglary statutes
and find that they meet their needs and portray their collective community sentiments for how that
crime should be defined, there is reason to understand why the statute would remain static even
after civic engagement with the statute.
144 See LISA L. MILLER, THE PERILS OF FEDERALISM: RACE, POVERTY, AND THE POLITICS
OF CRIME CONTROL 7-8 (2008) (explaining why local, state, and federal lawmakers have divergent
policy goals in part due to different structural incentives and types of constituent accountability).
145 See id.
146 See Divine, supra note 8, at 131-33 (outlining the benefits of dynamic incorporation when
Congress drafts incorporative statutes).
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engagement.147 Instead, state and local actors have very little appreciation,
notice, or care for how statutory incorporation empowers their state
legislative decisions.148
Federalism also gives states the freedom to operate as “laboratories,”149
cultivating new and creative policy solutions within their borders that can
then be exported to the nation if proven successful.150 But statutory
incorporation does little to foster such experimentation. When Congress
incorporates state law into a federal statute, it does not pick the best law from
the best states based on their experimentation or policy expertise. Instead,
Congress indiscriminately incorporates the law from all fifty states, in effect
creating fifty different applications of the federal statute.151 This type of
incorporation does not encourage or incentivize experimentation. It does not
reward expertise or spark a race to the top among state policy makers.
Congress is indifferent as to the “best” state laws carefully developed in
democratic laboratories that can be spread to benefit the entire nation and is
instead content with allowing each state’s law—good or bad—to govern
federal outcomes.
Encouraging experimentation among the states is closely tied to reaping
the competitive benefits of federalism. Most closely associated with Professor
Charles Tiebout’s public choice theories,152 competitive theories of federalism
argue that states strive to offer superior policies to compete for and attract
economic and political power.153 Thus, businesses and individuals will vote
See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
See Logan, Creating a Hydra in Government, supra note 28, at 89, 100 (suggesting that the
lack of engagement between state and federal legislatures likely results in state actors not fully
appreciating statutory incorporation’s empowerment of state law); see also United States v. Meade,
175 F.3d 215, 225 (1st Cir. 1999) (recognizing that statutory incorporation did not affect state court
proceedings or other state criminal justice outcomes). But see Dorf, supra note 23, at 139 (arguing
that incorporation “increases the democratic character of the [federal] system”).
149 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest
of the country.”).
150 See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47 FLA. L. REV. 499, 529 (1995) (“Courts
and commentators frequently have recognized that the [fifty] States serve as laboratories for the
development of new social, economic, and political ideas.”).
151 See Divine, supra note 8, at 154 (“Dynamic incorporation invites the legislatures of all fifty
states to influence application of federal law . . . [because] each of the fifty legislatures receive power
to update (at least partly) application of federal law in those states.”).
152 See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418
(1956) (“The consumer-voter may be viewed as picking that community which best satisfies his
preference pattern for public goods.”).
153 See Wallace E. Oates, On the Evolution of Fiscal Federalism: Theory and Institutions, 61 NAT’L
TAX J. 313, 314, 318-19 (2008) (explaining that the traditional theory of fiscal federalism, which
focuses “on the potential welfare gains . . . from a more efficient allocation of resources in the public
sector,” differs from the Tiebout Model because it does not depend on the mobility of households).
147
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with their feet by migrating to and investing in the states with the policies
that best conform to their preferences.154 Of all the theories of federalism,
statutory incorporation might actually deliver on some of these goals in
certain areas of the law. For instance, there is evidence in bankruptcy and tax
contexts that sophisticated businesses and individuals indeed maximize their
financial interests by migrating to friendly states and investing resources and
assets into those states.155 There is also evidence that states are aware of how
their laws attract businesses and individuals because of their influence on
federal tax and bankruptcy outcomes.156 However, the same is not true when
it comes to other contexts of statutory incorporation. States do not compete
for citizens looking for the most lenient burglary laws or the broadest family
or tort laws that might benefit their individual interests in those areas. This
awareness might explain why states vigilantly update their tax statutes but
not their burglary statutes.157 And as stated above, most Americans simply do
not have the resources to relocate or the legal training to understand the
nuanced differences between state criminal, property, and tort regimes.158 As
a result, statutory incorporation provides some benefits of competitive
federalism, but is still largely incongruent.
2. Contemporary Nationalism
Statutory incorporation is largely out of step with the traditional goals of
federalism, but it has found favor in some contemporary theories. Professor
Abbe Gluck has rightfully recognized how much statutory law shapes modern
conceptions of federalism,159 and argues that statutory incorporation is one
154 See Tiebout, supra note 152, at 420 (acknowledging that citizens voting with their feet exert
market pressures on jurisdictions to satisfy the consumer-voter’s preference for public goods and
taxes at the lowest cost); JAMES M. BUCHANAN & RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE
AND PUBLIC CHOICE: TWO CONTRASTING VISIONS OF THE STATE 179 (1999) (acknowledging
the “exit option” for “individuals, as resource owners and as residents . . . [and noting that] [i]f there
is an exit option, if there is a chance to leave, this necessarily imposes discipline on those who would
exploit [citizens] through a political structure”).
155 See Robert R. Preuhs, State Policy Components of Interstate Migration in the United States, 52
POL. RSCH. Q. 527, 544 (1999) (“[Finding that because] voters do act as consumers and are willing
to move to increase utility . . . migration patterns . . . are influenced by public policy and the
economy.”).
156 See, e.g., Robert K. Rasmussen & Randall S. Thomas, Timing Matters: Promoting ForumShopping by Insolvent Corporations, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1357, 1385 (2000) (describing the Delaware
legislature’s awareness that state corporate laws attract firms and bolster tax revenues).
157 See supra notes 139–141 and accompanying text.
158 See Pope, supra note 111 and accompanying text.
159 See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State
Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 541 (2011) (addressing
a more “interpretive dimension to federalism” arising from Congress giving “both state and federal
implementers concurrent jurisdiction over the same federal statutory terrain.”).
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such embodiment that serves to empower state law.160 Professor Gluck is a
prominent and contributing member of the “Nationalism” school of
federalism.161 Nationalists highlight how modern dynamics have transitioned
from the traditional “line drawing” between federal–state–local power to more
interdependent relationships where these governments work together to
implement policies in areas in which they have overlapping power.162 Its central
contribution is realizing that many of the same benefits under traditional
federalism remain,163 but can be intentionally redirected by federal officials to
benefit the entire nation instead of primarily benefiting the states.164
Professor Heather Gerken, a founding member of Nationalism,165 primarily
focuses her work on how the federal government can benefit when states are
engaged as agents to implement federal policy.166 Professor Bridget Fahey has
also studied how written contracts memorializing these principal–agent
160 See Gluck, Our [National] Federalism, supra note 16, at 1997-98 (explaining how Congress,
as federalism’s “primary source,” enables states to “restrain the breadth of federal law” and introduce
their own “expertise, variety, traditional authority, and sovereign lawmaking apparatus into federal
statutes.”).
161 Although “nationalism” carries multiple meanings across different academic literatures, it
is the term that many leading members of this school of thought use to refer to their separate theories
of federalism. See, e.g., id. at 1999 (using the term “National Federalism”); Heather K. Gerken,
Federalism 3.0, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1695, 1720 (2017) [hereinafter Gerken, Federalism 3.0] (using the
term “new nationalists”).
162 See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Overview, 123 YALE L.J.
1889, 1889 (2014) (arguing that federalism as the new nationalism is “[s]horn of the traditional trappings
of sovereignty and separate spheres . . . [and] “attentive to the rise of national power . . . .”); Gillian E.
Metzger, The States as National Agents, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1071, 1073 (2015) (“What do state autonomy
and state sovereignty mean in a world in which states are functioning and wielding their biggest powers
as national agents?”); Cristina M. Rodríguez, Negotiating Conflict Through Federalism: Institutional and
Popular Perspectives, 123 YALE L.J. 2094, 2097 (2014) (“[F]ederalism constitutes a framework for national
integration . . . .[because it] creates a multiplicity of institutions with lawmaking power through which
to develop national consensus [as well as meaningful disagreement] . . . .”).
163 An exception is that nationalists reject the traditional role that state experimentation plays
in federalism theory, describing this concept as an antiquated vestige of traditional federalism. See
Gerken, Federalism 3.0, supra note 161, at 1720 (rejecting the “laboratories account [as] a myth” and
arguing that there are only two laboratories stemming from the major political parties that run their
policy experiments in any state where they can have a forum); see also Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan
Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1126 (2014) (explaining how some believe that the notion of states
as laboratories is oxymoronic because “organic local difference and grassroots problem-solving . . . are
absent from state experimentation framed by national partisan struggle.”).
164 See Heather K. Gerken, The Loyal Opposition, 123 YALE L.J. 1958, 1963 (2014) (arguing that
federalism today allows the national government to regulate the states and “police federalism’s worst
excesses . . . while taking advantage of its best features . . . .”).
165 See Gerken, Federalism 3.0, supra note 161, at 1719 (establishing Gerken’s status as a founder
of Nationalism and outlining her writings on the topic).
166 While Professor Gluck, discussed in subsection II.B.2, is also part of the Nationalist school,
her work differs by acknowledging that statutory forms of federalism need not serve national
interests, but can be utilized to preserve states’ rights. See Gluck, Our [National] Federalism, supra
note 16, at 2022.
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relationships facilitate Nationalism.167 Indeed, throughout its literature,
Nationalism emphasizes that these federal–state–local relationships are an active,
two-way relationship of which there is mutually recognized benefit.168
This seems to be at odds with statutory incorporation. There does not appear
to be any principal–agent relationship in the way that Nationalists would
recognize. There is certainly no written agreement, and no interaction between
the federal and state governments. Statutory incorporation is a unilateral
adoption of another jurisdiction’s law without any negotiation between the
jurisdictions. States will continue on their path with little if any acknowledgment
that their current and future laws will carry impactful ramifications in shaping
federal law.169 As Professor Fahey recognized, the dominant understanding of
modern federalism—as captured by Nationalism—is “a complex system of
governments working together instead of a limited-purpose partnership of fifty
states and one federal government operating separately.”170 This quote captures
the dichotomy that exists between mainstream federalism and statutory
incorporation. The former operates with interconnectedness and interdependence.
The latter allows fifty states to operate separately with little to no connection to the
federal government or its policy goals.
3. The Fiction of Federalism
After reviewing how little overlap statutory incorporation has with both
traditional and contemporary federalism theory, it comes as little surprise that
Congress itself is not primarily concerned with federalism during the drafting
process. Statutory realists who have conducted surveys and interviews with
congressional drafters have confirmed that while drafters appreciate federalism
concerns,171 it is not nearly as front of mind as federalism theorists might want
to believe. Just over half of drafters are even aware of federalism doctrines and
use them in the drafting process.172 And very few drafters use clear statements
167 See Fahey, supra note 122, at 2334 (arguing that intergovernmental agreements, in addition
to delineating distinct roles for each government, also participate “in guiding how they act
together”).
168 See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 14, at 1258-60 (arguing that states have tremendous
power over the federal government given their control over implementing federal policy); see also
Eric W. Orts, Shirking and Sharking: A Legal Theory of the Firm, 16 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 265, 27980 (1998) (explaining principal–agent theory as a two-way street).
169 See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 579, 632 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (“The
federal government’s choice to pursue deportation on the basis of local criminal justice outcomes is
something that cities and localities have no control over and presumably no input in.”).
170 Fahey, supra note 122, at 2353.
171 See Gluck & Bressman, Statutory Interpretation Part I, supra note 5, at 927-28, 942-44, 959
(providing empirical statistics indicating that federalism is but one concern among many for
congressional drafters).
172 See id.
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to achieve federalism goals.173 If a statute turns out to be ambiguous, these
drafters expressed their expectation that the federal statutory language, not
the state law, would control.174 This finding from statutory realism contradicts
scholarly and judicial assumptions that congressional drafters intend to imbue
federalism principles to empower state law in federal statutes.175
These insights from statutory realism should be appreciated in the
proper context, since congressional drafters were not specifically asked
about statutory incorporation but about federal statutes as a whole. In
general, it appears that federalism is a small part of discussions that
drafters and negotiators have, but not to the extent that would give judges
and scholars confidence that it should govern the interpretation of these
statutes. As applied to statutory incorporation, congressmembers and
drafters undoubtedly intended to give preference to state law by
incorporating it in material ways into federal statutes. But this does not
automatically mean that federalism was the reason for doing this. As stated
by statutory realism, federalism was perhaps on the radar but was likely
not a driving force in these federal incorporative statutes.
Professor David Shapiro’s comparison of federalism to a dialogue176 is
an apt way to think about federalism’s relationship to statutory
incorporation. If federalism is a conversation between federal, state, and
local powers, statutory incorporation may be likened to a conversation
Congress is having with state legislatures who are wearing headphones and
looking in the other direction. State legislatures do not even know they are
a part of the one-way conversation and continue on with their business
without concern to what they cannot hear. Can this interaction even be
considered a dialogue? Perhaps, but it shows how awkward and potentially
embarrassing the interaction can be for Congress seemingly talking to
somebody who pays little attention to it. In that way, Professor Shapiro’s
dialogue analogy is a fitting encapsulation of the shortcomings of
federalism and the lack of explanatory power it has concerning statutory
incorporation.

See id.
See id.
This is unsurprising, given that members of Congress are often concerned with maximizing
popular political benefits, and “public discourse has never been meaningfully affected by the
federalism implications” in statutes. Logan, Criminal Justice Federalism, supra note 126, at 107.
176 See generally SHAPIRO, supra note 129; see also Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 14, at
1271 (recognizing that such a dialogue “falls along a continuum.”).
173
174
175
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B. Delegation-Based Incorporation
The principal–agent theory that undergirds much of modern federalism
and Nationalism also serves as a cornerstone of the power dynamic in
congressional delegation.177 Over the past century, Congress has delegated
power to other institutions—primarily executive agencies—to interpret and
administer law as a necessary way to keep up with the expanding role of the
federal government.178 Statutory incorporation has been recognized as such a
congressional delegation,179 but instead of delegating to an administrative
agency, Congress delegates lawmaking authority to state legislatures.
The uniqueness of this legislature-to-legislature delegation creates an
interesting relationship that is undertheorized in the delegation literature
of administrative and legislative law. For this reason, this section does not
seek to recount the vast literature discussing the materially different
legislature-to-agency delegation model,180 but instead draws from that
model to better understand whether statutory incorporation can be justified
under the scrutiny of delegation theories.181
1. Expertise
For nearly eighty years, the primary justification for congressional
delegation has been the expertise of the delegate.182 All delegation relies on

177 See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 14, at 1262-63, 1265 nn.20–22 (recognizing that
most theories of interactive federalism employ some application of principal-agent theory and rely
on much of the administrative law literature); see also Yingyi Qian & Barry R. Weingast, Federalism
as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives, 11 J. ECON. PERSPS. 83, 84 (1997) (arguing that
federalism can be analyzed through theories of the firm).
178 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (“[The Court’s decisions on
delegation] ha[ve] been driven by a practical understanding that in our increasingly complex society,
replete with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent
an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.”).
179 See Dorf, supra note 23, at 105 (“[D]ynamic incorporation does delegate lawmaking
authority . . . .”); Gluck, Our [National] Federalism, supra note 16, at 2008 (“Congress can draw on
state expertise by taking well-developed bodies of state statutory or common law on the subject and
incorporating them by reference into the new federal statute.”).
180 Chevron remains as one of the most cited cases in history, and the literature on its family of
cases is outside the scope of this paper. See, e.g., Gluck, Our [National] Federalism, supra note 16, at
2023 n.120 (cataloguing notable scholarship in the canon of legislature-to-agency delegation).
181 See Peter H. Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn & Glen O. Robinson, A Theory of Legislative
Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 21-26 (1982) (“Conventional rationalizations for the delegation
of legislative authority . . . . [do not] withstand close scrutiny.”); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule,
Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1731 (2002) (“[I]f Congress has illicitly
given away legislative power, why should it matter who the recipient is?”).
182 For an early progenitor of this approach, see JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCESS 154-55 (1938) (justifying the administrative state on the superior expertise of executive
agencies).
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some version of the principal–agent relationship,183 which explains that
delegation is beneficial to the principal when the agent uses their expertise
or skills to achieve the principal’s goals.184 Therefore, congressional
delegation is often justified when Congress delegates to another institution
that has superior knowledge, information, or investigatory resources. 185
Advocates for statutory incorporation have argued that this same
dynamic exists when Congress delegates to state legislatures to shape
federal statutes.186 These theories argue that Congress, fulfilling the role
of the principal, benefits from the expertise of the states when it
incorporates state law in order to make federal statutes work better. And
indeed, the states could be said to have more expertise than the federal
government when it comes to defining criminal law, property rights, and
other traditional spheres of state law. But is this expertise merely
perceived, or does it actually have a basis in fact?
There are many methods that could be used to measure the expertise
of state legislatures, but one of the most widely accepted metrics of
professionalism shows that state legislatures lack the expertise to justify
any meaningful congressional delegation.187 Professors Peverill Squire’s
and Gary Moncrieff ’s extensive work studying state legislatures show that
their level of professionalism is far behind that of Congress. There are
three main factors used to determine legislative professionalism: first is
legislator pay; second is the number of days the legislature is in session;
and third is the staff resources of state legislators.188 All of these factors are
the exact types of objective measurements that would be useful to justify
delegation and are ultimately collated to determine a professionalism score
183 See Hannah J. Wiseman, Dysfunctional Delegation, 35 YALE J. ON REG. 233, 244 (2018)
(describing the challenges stemming from the principal-agent relationship, which is a form of
delegation).
184 See Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, Delegation in Immigration Law, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1285,
1290-91 (2012) (“The essence of the agency relationship is the superior information of the agent: the
principal delegates to the agent in order to take advantage of the agent’s expertise . . . .”).
185 See id.; see also Matthew C. Stephenson, Bureaucratic Decision Costs and Endogenous Agency
Expertise, 23 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 469, 469 (2007) (“The delegation of substantial policymaking
authority to administrative agencies is often both explained and justified by the belief that agencies
have more accurate information about the actual impacts of different policy choices.”).
186 See Dorf, supra note 23, at 136 (justifying statutory incorporation if the original jurisdiction
has a special expertise); Divine, supra note 8, at 134 (explaining benefits of other jurisdictions’
expertise).
187 See MILLER, supra note 144, at 87 (“[Professionalism measurements] offer[] a window into
the expertise, seriousness and effort of a legislative process.” (internal quotations omitted)).
188 See PEVERILL SQUIRE & GARY MONCRIEF, STATE LEGISLATURES TODAY: POLITICS
UNDER THE DOMES 62-63 (3d ed. 2020) (identifying different metrics used to measure
professionalism); see also THAD KOUSSER, TERM LIMITS AND THE DISMANTLING OF STATE
LEGISLATIVE PROFESSIONALISM 12 (2005) (noting the three widely accepted components of
legislative professionalism).
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for each legislature. Legislator pay is an important metric because it
correlates with the time legislators are able to dedicate to developing
expertise and learning policy issues, while also mitigating attrition so
legislators stay in positions long enough to meaningfully increase their
legislative skills.189 The median state legislator salary, however, is only
$24,108,190 which is abysmal when compared to Congress’s $174,000.191 Some
states offer mere stipends and per diems for the days their part-time
legislatures are in session.192 The number of legislative days in session is an
important measurement because it allows legislators more time to legislate,
negotiate, and consider policy. But many state legislatures meet once a year
for a limited number of weeks. The median number of days in session for
state legislatures is 62.4 days per year.193 This is a far cry from the norms of
Congress, a full-time legislature where both houses hold roughly 150
legislative days in session every year.194 Indeed, these short legislative sessions
increase time pressures on state legislatures, with many legislators admitting
to stunning clerical errors, word and grammar choice errors, and other
imperfections that can have ramifications later if Congress decides to
incorporate their state laws.195 The resources allotted for legislators to hire
staff is also of critical importance, allowing both clerical and professional staff
to shoulder heavy administrative burdens, handle research, facilitate
negotiations, and even draft bills.196 But staff numbers in state legislatures are
woefully small when compared to Congress. The mean among state

189 See SQUIRE & MONCRIEFF, supra note 188, at 62-63 (describing the relationship between
legislator pay and the time legislators devote to their duties).
190 Id. at 65.
191 See Robert Longley, Salaries and Benefits of US Congress Members, THOUGHTC O,
https://www.thoughtco.com/salaries-and-benefits-of-congress-members-3322282 [https://perma.cc/3JDLCCHG] (last updated July 26, 2021) (“The current salary for rank-and-file members of the House and Senate
is $174,000 per year.”).
192 See SQUIRE & MONCRIEFF, supra note 188, at 60-61 (describing the “modest” benefits
received by a Wyoming state senator serving part-time).
193 Id. at 65.
194 See Tom Murse, How Many Days a Year Congress Works, THOUGHTCO, https://www.
thoughtco.com/average-number-of-legislative-days-3368250 [https://perma.cc/34MB-LMAK] (last
updated Feb. 3, 2020) (recording that the House of Representatives has averaged 146.7 legislative days
a year since 2001, and the Senate has averaged 165 days a year for the same period). These numbers
only account for legislative days in which houses of Congress meet in committees or as a full legislative
body. It does not count the many days that congressmembers are still working, researching, drafting,
and conducting other political duties.
195 See SQUIRE & MONCRIEFF, supra note 188, at 145-46 (documenting state legislator
interviews describing numerous errors made by switching out bill numbers and making word choice
and grammatical errors, in part because of immense time pressures caused by short legislative
sessions).
196 See Nourse & Schacter, supra note 5, at 584-88 (finding that staffers, lobbyists, and
legislative counsel take on most of the drafting duties in the legislative process).
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legislatures was 4.5 staff members in 2018,197 whereas Congress boasted a
mean of 17 staff members in 2000.198 In addition to these individual staff
members, Congress also enjoys hundreds of shared committee staff with even
more specified expertise on the subject matter of the particular congressional
committee.199 All of these compiled metrics paint a dismal picture of state
legislatures. When the professionalism of Congress is set at 1, the mean state
legislature has a professionalism score of .225.200 While legislatures in larger
states like California and New York rival the professionalism of Congress,
those in smaller states like Montana and New Hampshire measure at .116 and
.048 respectively.201 This general lack of professionalism and expertise among
state legislatures is enough to doubt the efficacy of statutory incorporation as
an exercise of beneficial delegation.
While professionalism measurements seek to determine legislative
expertise, some might argue that state legislators have the expertise of
knowing their constituents’ preferences. Thus, they should be more
trustworthy to legislate according to such preferences that would later be
incorporated by Congress into federal law. But there is no reason to believe
that state legislators have superior expertise to congressmembers themselves.
State legislators are elected by the same constituents that elect
congressmembers from their congressional districts and states. Therefore,
congressmembers would have the same or comparable expertise of their
constituents’ preferences when compared to state legislators. All of this
supports a conclusion that relying on the questionable expertise of state
legislatures is not enough to justify the practice of statutory incorporation.
2. Democratic Accountability
In addition to expertise, another traditional justification for delegation is
democratic accountability; simply put, Congress might prefer to delegate
law-making authority to agencies rather than drafting laws to be interpreted
by courts because agencies are more democratically accountable than federal

SQUIRE & MONCRIEFF, supra note 188, at 65.
See I’d Like to Know More About Congressional Staff and What they Do—And What they Get
Paid!, C-SPAN (Nov. 15, 2000), https://web.archive.org/web/20150617104805/https://legacy.cspan.org/questions/weekly35.asp [https://perma.cc/428Z-UHMN] (recording that the average
House of Representatives member employed 14 personal staff, and the average Senate member
employed 34 staff).
199 See Shobe, supra note 5, at 845 (recording that committee staff totaled 1,324 in the House
and 913 in the senate in 2009); see also Sitaraman, supra note 5, at 87-88 (explaining different roles
and expertise of congressional personal and committee staff).
200 SQUIRE & MONCRIEFF, supra note 188, at 65.
201 Id. at 65-66.
197
198
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courts.202 Having a certain level of oversight and control in the form of
democratic accountability is a foundational piece of successful principal–
agent relationships. One of the risks when a principal delegates power to an
agent is that the agent will not carry out the principal’s goals or will do so in
an inefficient way. Scholars have used this insight to argue for a balance of
power that allows principals to effectively monitor their agents while also
allowing agents the freedom and flexibility to find the best ways to fulfill their
principal’s goals.203 Congress has at its disposal tools of oversight and control
with respect to executive agencies. While many agency heads and members
of the President’s cabinet are not elected, they serve at the pleasure of the
President and are confirmed by the Senate. In addition, congressmembers
maintain healthy control over agencies because various congressional
committees have oversight authority over certain agencies, are entitled to
hold periodic hearings, and have access to agency reports to increase agency
transparency.204 Congress also has the power of the purse to indirectly control
the influence and scope of agency prerogatives.205 Further, Congress passed
the Administrative Procedure Act206 and the rulemaking procedures therein
to ensure a robust public comment requirement and other adjudicatory
procedures. This gives members of the public tremendous opportunities to
be heard and potentially shape policy from the ground level.207
When these principles of superior democratic accountability are applied
to statutory incorporation, state legislatures prove much less accountable to
Congress than agencies. As stated above, the same constituents that elect state
202 See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Re. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984)
(“While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely
appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such policy choices. . . .”); see also
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 181, at 1748 (describing Congress’s lack of accountability for agency
decisions when power is delegated to those agencies). But see Caroline Cecot, Deregulatory CostBenefit Analysis and Regulatory Stability, 68 DUKE L.J. 1593, 1650 (2019) (“[B]road delegations to
agencies may reduce political accountability. . . .”).
203 See, e.g., Wiseman, supra note 183, at 237-39, 281-89 (explaining principal–agent problems
in cooperative federalism and prescribing oversight tools to ensure better cooperation between the
federal and state governments); see also Cox & Posner, supra note 184, at 1290-91 (acknowledging the
difficulty of a principal effectively monitoring an agent’s actions).
204 See Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes and the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 405, 448 (2008) (“[A]gencies are democratically
accountable, at least derivatively, because of their relationship with the president and Congress”).
205 See generally Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343 (1988) (describing
several ways Congress can control executive and agency actions and priorities through allocating or
rescinding funds).
206 See generally TODD GARVEY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41546, A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF
RULEMAKING AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2017) (describing administrative rule-making procedures
under the Administrative Procedure Act).
207 See Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David Schoenbrod, 20
CARDOZO L. REV. 775, 781 (1999) (arguing that agencies are more accessible to the public because
participation in agency proceedings are likely to be less costly than lobbying Congress).
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legislators also elect congressmembers to federal office. Therefore, in state
legislatures, there are no superior or other nuanced benefits of democratic
accountability; instead, the democratic accountability is the same between
congressmembers and state legislators. If there is no benefit on this front,
why should Congress delegate in the first place? Especially when there is no
material institutional difference that justifies the delegation. State
legislatures do not have superior rulemaking procedures that enhance
democratic accountability. In fact, they tend to hold fewer public hearings
than Congress does.208
Further, by delegating to state legislatures, Congress willfully gives up the
power of oversight that it enjoys over executive agencies. The defining feature
of statutory incorporation—the one-way unilateral relationship—prevents
any such monitoring or effective control. Congress has no control over state

208 Compare Congressional Hearings, GOVINFO, https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/chrg/116 (last
visited Nov. 11, 2021) (choose “116th Congress (2019–2020);” then choose “House Hearings”; then choose
“Committee on Agriculture,” “Committee on Appropriations,” “Committee on Armed Services,”
“Committee on Education and Labor,” “Committee on Energy and Commerce,” “Committee on Financial
Services,” “Committee on Foreign Affairs,” “Committee on Homeland Security,” “Committee on House
Administration,” “Committee on Natural Resources,” “Committee on Oversight and Reform,” “Committee
on Science, Space, and Technology,” “Committee on Small Business,” “Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure,” “Committee on Veteran’s Affairs,” “Committee on Ways and Means,” “Committee on the
Budget,” “Committee on the Judiciary,” “Congressional-Executive Commission on China,” “Select
Committee on the Climate Crisis”; then choose “Senate Hearings”; then choose “Committee on Agriculture,
Nutrition, and Forestry,” “Committee on Appropriations,” “Committee on Armed Services,” “Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,” “Committee on Energy and Natural Resources,” “Committee on
Environment and Public Works,” “Committee on Finance,” “Committee on Foreign Relations,” “Committee
on Health, Education, and Pensions,” “Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,”
“Committee on Indian Affairs,” “Committee on Rules and Administration,” “Committee on Small Business
and Entrepreneurship,” “Committee on Veteran’s Affairs,” “Committee on the Budget,” “Committee on the
Judiciary,” “Congressional Oversight Commission,” “Joint Economic Committee,” “Select Committee on
Intelligence,” and “United States Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control”; then choose “Joint
Hearings”; then choose “Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe” and “Committee on Veteran’s
Affairs”) (showing that Congress held over a thousand hearings in 2019), with Committee Hearings, N.Y.
STATE ASSEMBLY, https://nyassembly.gov/av/hearings/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2021) (choose “2019”), and
Statewide Senate Events Calendar, N.Y. STATE SENATE, https://www.nysenate.gov/events (last visited Nov. 11,
2021) (choose “Public Hearing” from first dropdown; then choose “VIEW BY MONTH” option; then choose
“Jan,” then choose “Feb,” then choose “Mar,” then choose “Apr,” then choose “May,” then choose “Jun,” then
choose “Jul,” then choose “Aug,” then choose “Sep,” then choose “Oct,” then choose “Nov,” then choose “Dec”)
(showing that New York Senate and Assembly held a total of 129 public hearings in 2019), and Senate Committee
Hearings and Events, TEX. STATE SENATE, https://www.senate.texas.gov/events.php (last visited Nov. 11,
2021) (choose “Administration,” “Agriculture,” “Business & Commerce,” “Criminal Justice,” “Education,”
“Finance,” “Health & Human Services,” “Higher Education,” “Intergovernmental Relations,” “Natural
Resources & Economic Development,” “Nominations,” “Property Tax,” “State Affairs,” “Transportation,”
“Veteran Affairs & Border Security,” and “Water & Rural Affairs”) (showing that the Texas Senate held 168
hearings in 2019); see also SQUIRE & MONCREIFF, supra note 188, at 137 (finding that few states require every
bill to receive a hearing).
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legislative budgets.209 It cannot hold state legislatures accountable by calling
them to testify at hearings to increase their transparency. Congress also
cannot tell state legislatures to update their laws to adhere to federal goals of
statutory incorporation. Any such attempt to do so would likely violate the
anti-commandeering doctrine, which prohibits Congress from dictating what
states can and cannot legislate on with the limited exception of preempted
areas of the law.210 Instead, Congress seems to be content with ceding control
of federal laws, embarking on a “policy ‘lottery’” of how the law might be
applied, with no ability to reign in their state agent.211
A related deficiency of statutory incorporation is the lack of incentives
that normally motivate agents in a principal–agent relationship. In the
contractual context, there is usually some exchange of payment from principal
to agent, ensuring the agent will use its expertise to effectively fulfill the
principal’s goals. This is also true in the federalism context, where the federal
government promises states coveted federal funding to implement various
programs,212 many of which are captured in explicit contracts and other
formal agreements.213 Statutory incorporation, however, lacks incentives to
encourage states to fulfill the goals of Congress. There is no federal funding
if states adopt laws that Congress deems fit for its statutory regimes; there is
little power that accompanies bending federal policy to the legislature’s will;
indeed, there is little, if any, empowerment of the state legislature. So why
would a state legislature act as a responsible agent, especially if it may not
even know the extent of its agency? Such a lack of incentives is yet another
209 See Larkin, supra note 22, at 373 (recognizing that Congress has much less control over state
actors when delegating authority since they have no ability to check state actors or control the
budgets of state actors).
210 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 176 (1992) (striking down a federal provision
requiring that states legislate in accordance with federal policy); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.
898, 933 (1997) (striking down a federal provision requiring state executive agents to run background
checks on would-be gun purchasers because it commandeered state executive officials); see also Jessica
Bulman-Pozen, Preemption and Commandeering Without Congress, 70 STAN. L. REV. 2029, 2041-47
(2018) (explaining nuances between federal commandeering of state powers and preemption).
211 See Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncertainty, Risk, and
the Choice between Agencies and Courts, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1035, 1037 (2006) (describing delegation
as Congress embarking on a “policy ‘lottery’” in how a law might be interpreted and implemented).
212 See, e.g., Samuel H. Clovis, Jr., Federalism, Homeland Security and National Preparedness: A
Case Study in the Development of Public Policy, 2 HOMELAND SEC. AFFS., Oct. 2006, at 5 (citing
MORTON GRODZINS, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM: A NEW VIEW OF GOVERNMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES (Daniel J. Elazar ed., 1966)); see also Wayne A. Logan, Criminal Justice Federalism
and National Sex Offender Policy, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 51, 63 (2008) (describing a federal criminal
registry program that used a “stick” by withholding federal funds unless states developed sexoffender registries); John Kincaid, From Cooperative to Coercive Federalism, 509 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI. 139, 148-49 (1990) (describing coercive federalism that seeks to punish states for
not cooperating with federal programs).
213 See generally Fahey, supra note 122, at 2329 (describing extensive relationships between state
and federal governments governed by executed contracts).
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reason why delegation—which is governed by principal–agent theory—lacks
explanatory power to justify statutory incorporation.
3. The Fiction of Delegation
Like federalism, the mainstream justifications for delegation cannot be
used to justify the legislature-to-legislature transfer of lawmaking authority
through statutory incorporation. Also like federalism, statutory realists have
found little evidence from surveys and interviews with congressional drafters
that delegations of these kinds are meant to reap the benefits of the more
traditional model of legislature-to-agency delegation. While congressional
drafters overwhelmingly acknowledge their intention to delegate certain lawmaking authority to executive agencies, they reject the idea that they
commonly delegate to other institutions.214 They are perfectly comfortable
with characterizing their relationship with agencies as one of a principal and
agent through delegation of their authority but see no such relationship with
other institutions.215
As applied to statutory incorporation, it is unlikely that Congress ever
intended to set up a principal–agent relationship with state legislatures. The
admissions of congressional drafters show that while Congress does intend to
delegate certain matters to executive agencies, its purported delegations to
state legislatures are a legal fiction. Statutory incorporation is indeed a
delegation, but one from which Congress never intended to reap the
relationship or benefits of traditional delegation doctrine.
*

*

*

The mainstream theories that courts and scholars have used to justify
statutory incorporation have been weighed, measured, and found wanting.
Traditional and contemporary views of federalism cannot justify the unique,
unilateral one-way relationship of statutory incorporation. And the expertise
and accountability used to justify delegation are suspect when considering the
professionalism of state legislatures and the lack of democratic and principal–
agent controls inherent in a legislature-to-legislature delegation. These
theories offer unsatisfying answers to the question this Article seeks to
answer; why does Congress use statutory incorporation even considering all
the practical and moral difficulties it produces? In light of Part II’s failure to
answer this question, Part III continues by presenting a novel theory with the
power to explain this legislative practice.
214 See Gluck & Bressman, Statutory Interpretation Part II, supra note 5, at 765 (noting resistance
to acknowledging the existence of a dialogue between Congress and courts).
215 Id.
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III. INTEREST-BASED INCORPORATION
Interest-based incorporation expands upon the accomplishments of
statutory realism. Courts and scholars give Congress too much intellectual
credit by using erudite theories of federalism and delegation to explain
statutory incorporation when, in reality, congressmembers are concerned
with self-interested political loss aversion.216 Many of the laws Congress
passes are not designed with such careful attention to theoretical benefits, but
“for symbolic and politically profitable purposes . . . .”217 And even federalism
and delegation theorists have themselves recognized that these political goals
play a role in developing legislation, but they instead have chosen to highlight
different aspects of the process in their own federalism and delegation
scholarship.218
This Part explores how the self-interests of congressmembers fits within
the existing theoretical framework used to justify statutory incorporation. By
incorporating state law, Congress can diffuse power and delegate to states,
while also diffusing and delegating political accountability. Thus, Congress
can receive credit for positive developments while simultaneously shifting
blame onto the states for negative outcomes. Congress also gains political
benefits by partnering with interest groups and lobbyists during the
legislative process.
In addition, statutory incorporation allows Congress to benefit from the
legislative efficiency of drafting ambiguous terms into statutes. Congress can
avoid difficult negotiations that might otherwise stifle the legislative process
by incorporating state law in a way that allows opposing negotiators to walk
away happy, knowing that their constituents will be subject only to their
state’s interpretation of the law.

216 Id. at 735 (recognizing that “most everyone acknowledges” that legislative drafting is driven
by outside influences such as political considerations).
217 Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement
Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757, 772 (1999); see also Lawrence Ponoroff, Constitutional Limitations
on State-Enacted Bankruptcy Exemption Legislation and the Long Overdue Case for Uniformity, 88 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 353, 356-57 (2014) (documenting “partisan political posturing” in congressional
consideration of state-law bankruptcy exemptions, devoid of “high-minded principle.”).
218 See, e.g., Gerken, Federalism 3.0, supra note 161, at 1702 (“[T]he federal government’s success
almost always depends as much on politics as decrees.”); Abbe R. Gluck, Nationalism as the New
Federalism (and Federalism as the New Nationalism): A Complementary Account (and Some Challenges)
to the Nationalist School, 59 ST. LOUIS UNIV. L.J. 1045, 1047 (2015) (“[P]olitical considerations also
incentivize Congress to include state actors in federal schemes . . . .”); Edward H. Stiglitz, Delegating
for Trust, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 653 (2018) (hypothesizing a theory of delegation based on the
assumption that legislators are self-interested and operate in accordance with a desire to be
reelected).
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A. Shifting Accountability
One of the key features of statutory incorporation is its ability to shift
blame away from congressmembers and onto state legislatures for flaws in
federal law or policy.219 This scapegoating theory regards Congress as a body
of individual members whose primary goals are reelection.220 As rational
economic actors, congressmembers will enact legislation according to a lossaversion principle, seeking to maximize benefits to increase their reelection
chances while mitigating risks of adopting unpopular or ineffective policies.221
This principle is especially applicable in criminal law policy, where public
opinion is particularly unforgiving if a law proves to be underinclusive and
allows a perceived criminal off the hook.222 Delegation and diffusion through
statutory incorporation, from a loss-aversion standpoint, is a brilliant strategy
of legislative design that ensures individual congressmembers only reap the
benefits of incorporative statutes and are rarely held accountable for the
costs.223 Many scholars have contributed to this scapegoating theory in other
contexts,224 but it is underexplored in the study of statutory incorporation.225
Under the scapegoating theory, congressmembers would find statutory
incorporation attractive. By attaching federal criminal consequences to the
states’ definition of “burglary,” for example, Congress gets the credit for
passing tough-on-crime laws in criminal justice and immigration statutes.
However, if a perceived dangerous person or noncitizen escapes punishment
due to the under inclusivity of state law or some other legal loophole,
Congress can shift blame to the applicable state law or state official that let

219 See GLEN O. ROBINSON, AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY: PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW
76-77 (1991) (describing “a strategy of ambiguity in which the legislator can seek credit for doing
something while shifting blame for outcomes that cause unexpected political harm”).
220 See DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 13 (1974)
(justifying the assumption that members of Congress are primarily interested in reelection).
221 See Divine, supra note 8, at 160 (recognizing that the loss-aversion principle can apply to
individual congressmembers and can impact the legislative process); see also Richard A. Posner,
Toward an Economic Theory of Federal Jurisdiction, 6 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 41, 44 (1982) (applying
the risk-aversion principle to explain political processes at the state and federal level).
222 See F. Andrew Hessick & Carissa Byrne Hessick, Nondelegation and Criminal Law, 107 VA.
L. REV. 281, 312-313 (2021) (describing congressional blame-shifting in the criminal context).
223 See Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and Criminal Law: What the Feds Can Learn from the States,
109 MICH. L. REV. 519, 539-40 (2011) (“[F]rom Congress’s perspective, . . . it reaps only benefits
from such a decision and does not pay a price [when delegating criminal law enforcement].”).
224 See, e.g., Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary,
7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35, 43 (1993) (discussing blame-shifting in the context of delegating to
courts); Morris P. Fiorina, Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative
Process?, 39 PUB. CHOICE 33, 46-52 (1982) (discussing blame-shifting in the context of delegating
to agencies).
225 See, e.g., Logan, Creating a Hydra in Government, supra note 28, at 85-89 (offering a rare
discussion of scapegoating in the context of statutory incorporation in criminal law).
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that person off the hook.226 The same can be true of bankruptcy laws or
federal benefits statutes, giving congressmembers all of the benefits for
passing laws that are responsive to their constituents and produce positive
outcomes but allowing them to pass blame for negative or unpopular
outcomes onto state actors if their state law produces undesired outcomes
among debtors or beneficiaries.227
Considering these self-interested goals of the scapegoating theory has
important implications. First, the individualism of congressmembers should
be highlighted.228 Any broad presumptions that Congress as a whole might
use statutory incorporation to signal values of federalism or delegation should
be appropriately discounted.229 Instead, individual congressmembers are
more interested in winning reelection than they are in imbuing statutes with
the purported benefits of ivory-tower theory. Second, individual self-interest
also challenges whether statutory incorporation or similar legislative schemes
serve the public interest.230 As Arrow’s Theorem predicts, when the
individual self-interests of congressmembers are properly accounted for, it is
nearly impossible to ensure that any given majority vote in Congress will
capture the voters’ interests.231 Third, the self-interests at play in statutory
incorporation muddle individual congressmembers’ loyalties to the federal
government when compared to their local constituents. Congressmembers
“are as much officers of the entire Union as is the President,”232 and must
serve federal interests when passing laws, irrespective of their loyalty to their
home districts. Thus, while a member representing a particular congressional
226 See Evan Lee, Regulating Crimmigration 8 (U.C. Hastings L. Studs. Rsch. Paper Series,
Research Paper No. 128, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2559485
[https://perma.cc/J2QX-UTFK] (using a scapegoating argument to explain why Congress does not
clearly define terms in criminal and immigration statutes).
227 As an example, congressmembers may take credit for federal bankruptcy laws when debtors
are able to reap substantial benefits from their state homestead exemption laws but would scapegoat
state laws that do not provide such generous homestead exemptions when debtors do not get positive
outcomes.
228 See Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 248-50 (1992) (explaining that individual legislators have different
intents and purposes).
229 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 547 (1983) (“Although
legislators have individual lists of desires, priorities, and preferences, it turns out to be difficult,
sometimes impossible, to aggregate these lists into a coherent collective choice.”).
230 See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION 38-42 (1991) (discussing the implications of cycling, agenda setting, and strategic
behavior).
231 See id. at 38 (noting that special interests can corrupt politicians, leading to “political
outcomes [that] will represent only the self-interest of factions rather than the public interest”).
232 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 803 (1995); accord Logan, Creating a
Hydra in Government, supra note 28, at 89 (explaining that federal government “reflects collective
national interests and values”).
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district in Ohio or California might prefer to incorporate the laws of those
states into federal law, this goes against their ethical and professional duties
to do what is best for the federal electorate. Of course, it is not uncommon
for congressmembers to fight for pork and other federal benefits with which
to shower their constituents, but statutory incorporation goes further by
federally incorporating state law. If congressmembers prefer the preferences
of their states’ laws, is incorporation into federal statutes serving the federal
interests that they have sworn to uphold, or is it serving their individual states
and self-interests first? Statutory incorporation presents these ethical questions
that are unlikely to produce ethical answers among congressmembers seeking
reelection above their duty.
B. Interest Group Realities
The self-interests highlighted in interest-based incorporation also help
explain the important role that interest groups and lobbyists play in the
statutory drafting process. Interest group theories of politics have received
extensive commentary,233 and their influence on congressional processes is
undeniable. Several studies documenting the legislative drafting process
found that lobbyists are regularly involved in drafting statutes and even offer
first drafts of bills for congressional drafters and legislative counsels to
consider.234 Indeed, many congressional drafters have become somewhat
dependent on the research and expertise of lobbyists, finding them to be
helpful resources.235 Further, the pecuniary influence of lobbyists on
Congress has only increased in recent years, going from $1.45 billion in 1998
to $3.5 billion in 2020.236 In short, congressional drafters are likely less

233 For a brief recitation of relevant pieces, see generally Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group
Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31 (1991); William N. Landes & Richard
A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J. L. & ECON. 875, 877 (1975)
(arguing that interest groups form a market-based process trying to outbid other competition for
congressional influence); and Marci A. Hamilton, Discussion and Decisions: A Proposal to Replace the
Myth of Self-Rule with an Attorneyship Model of Representation, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 477, 498 (1994)
(noting scholarship that characterizes certain legislators are mere “notary publics” who memorialize
the private deals made by interest groups in statutory form).
234 See Nourse & Schacter, supra note 5, at 583 (detailing the frequency of lobbyist
involvement); Gluck & Bressman, Statutory Interpretation Part II, supra note 5, at 740, 747 (finding
that legislative counsel, who draft a majority of statutory text, are less able to change or edit statutory
text when they are presented with a draft from an outside group such as lobbyists).
235 See Nourse & Schacter, supra note 5, at 610 (detailing interviews with legislative drafters
that find lobbyists useful due to the expertise, legal research, and information they bring to the
process).
236 Lobbying Database, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLS, http://www.opensecrets.org/federallobbying [https://perma.cc/5HPR-48D8].

388

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 170: 341

occupied with federalism and delegation concerns as they are with interest
group influences.237
This interest group dynamic has notable quid pro quo benefits for all
parties involved. Congressmembers benefit from the immense research,
expertise, and resources of interest groups during the legislative process.238
This research and expertise can help pass laws more effectively, and lobbyists
may be able to spread enough influence to build political coalitions that are
necessary to pass bills into law. In addition, congressmembers also benefit
from making important allies in the private sector during the legislative
process that may turn into important campaign contributors. Interest groups
in return get high levels of access to the legislative drafting process and enjoy
tremendous influence over federal laws.239
As applied to statutory incorporation, interest groups may favor
delegations of power to weaker institutions that are more susceptible to
interest group capture.240 Others have argued that interest groups would
prefer greater centralization of power because capture of this single power
source would be more efficient than capturing multiple power sources.241 But
this consolidation of power in Congress or in federal agencies may indeed
require more investment and resources than a delegation and diffusion to
state legislatures through statutory incorporation.
First, state legislators are paid much less than congressmembers and have
fewer legislative resources in the forms of time, research, and staff.242 Thus,
state legislators may be more susceptible to interest group capture than
members of Congress who have more resources, more eyes on them, and more
responsibility. Second, state legislative bodies tend to be much smaller with
fewer legislators than Congress, meaning it may cost less to influence the few
state legislators needed to sway a vote than it would be to do so in the larger

237 See Gluck & Bressman, Statutory Interpretation Part I, supra note 5, at 973 (finding that even
floor debates on federal statutes are used for political purposes to signal and communicate with
interest groups, so as to shore up their support in election campaigns).
238 See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
239 See Nourse & Schacter, supra note 5, at 623 (discussing the involvement of interest groups in
the legislative process and whether that level of access “is appropriate from a policy standpoint . . . .”).
240 See Rossi, supra note 26, at 486 (“[I]nterest groups can manipulate the legislative process and,
through delegation, vest lawmaking with an agent that will be more susceptible to capture . . . .”).
241 See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 54, at 99-100 (“When lawmaking is done on the state
level . . . attempts by interest groups to achieve nationwide uniformity are by and large doomed . . . .
[F]ederalism dilutes the influence of out-of-state interest groups and diminishes their ability to pass
inefficient legislation for the whole country.”); see also Metzger, supra note 162, at 1074 (“[H]aving the
states serve as key program implementers opens up new political battlefields. Groups must battle on a
state-by-state basis, rather than consolidate their political pressure and leverage at the national level.”).
242 See supra notes 189–201 and accompanying text.
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Congress.243 Third, interest groups are not always interested in creating
nationwide policies, but may be more attuned to regional and intrastate goals,
if their clients operate only in a small number of states. While lobbyists are
usually perceived as working out of big firms on K Street that represent multinational conglomerates, lobbyists may have just as much business in
representing smaller interests and clients looking to influence regional
politics in the pockets around the country in which they do business. Thus,
influencing congressmembers to use statutory incorporation empowers
interest groups to efficiently target specific states and regions in accordance
with regional clients. And finally, interest groups may favor statutory
incorporation from a competition standpoint. Because Congress is the largest
locust of consolidated legislative power in the nation, competition among
lobbyists vying for congressional influence would be greater on the national
level than if power were diffused to lesser legislatures. Criminologist Lisa
Miller has documented how interest groups, large and small, can skew
federalism goals at the local level by ensuring that less organized interests are
drowned out by well-resourced and well-organized interest groups.244 This is
often the case with national interest groups, such as the NRA or the ACLU.245
When these larger interest groups take interest in state and local lawmaking,
they displace local mores with nationalized agendas in the creation of state
and local law.246 Therefore, there is merit to the belief that national interest
groups and the lobbyists they hire are indeed interested in swaying local and
state legislatures.
Interest groups play an ever-important role in the legislative process, and
their influence must be appreciated when considering statutory incorporation.
The quid pro quo relationship that benefits the self-interests of congressmembers
as well as the regional and national aims of interest groups explains why statutory
incorporation is an attractive legislative tool for both parties.

243 See Note, City Government in the State Courts, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1596, 1597 (1965)
(characterizing arguments in THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 that smaller legislatures are more likely to
be swayed by factions).
244 See Lisa L. Miller, The Local and the Legal: American Federalism and the Carceral State, 10
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 725, 728 (2011) (“[T]he heavily skewed nature of representation and
voice in American politics . . . can easily overrepresent the interests of narrow but highly preferenceintense groups.”).
245 Id. at 728-29.
246 See, e.g., MILLER, supra note 144, at 6 (“The centralization of crime policy in state and
national governments and the institutionalization of crime policy agendas limit the voice of groups
who are most affected by crime and who frame crime as a public interest problem.”).
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C. Negotiating Ambiguity
Statutory incorporation also carries the benefits of intentional ambiguity.
Scholars have long recognized that ambiguous statutes are often the result of
intentional design,247 and the study of such ambiguity has large implications
for statutory interpretation.248 Incorporating state law is not all that different
from drafting an ambiguous term; whereas ambiguity describes how terms
and statutes can be legitimately interpreted in different ways, statutory
incorporation all but ensures that federal statutes will be interpreted and
applied several different ways among the different states.
The first benefit to drafting ambiguous terms is legislative efficiency.
Ambiguous terms allow negotiators to pass over difficult sticking points of
disagreement that would otherwise derail the legislative process or take too
much time to reach consensus.249 This is congruent with statutory incorporation.
Instead of using the precious little time available in most drafting and
negotiation sessions to hash out difficult issues of what “burglary,” “debt,” or
“child” should mean in federal statutes, drafters save tremendous time by
incorporating the laws of all fifty states into the statutes to resolve these
problems.250 This allows congressional drafters to insert a term that can be
read multiple different ways to prevent gridlock in the legislative process,
allowing each negotiator to leave the room believing they got what they
wanted. And perhaps each of them did, since using statutory incorporation
produces a federal statute that will apply differently in each state.
But legislative efficiency should be generally approached with suspicion,
especially if congressmembers are flagrantly ignoring their duty to draft
meaningful legislation. The federal legislative process was never intended to
be efficient; in fact, it was designed to be the opposite. The committee process,
multiple tiers of draftsmanship, and the nine vetogates described by Professor
William Eskridge, Jr. that a bill must hurdle before even getting to the

247 See Saul Levmore, Ambiguous Statutes, 77 CHI. L. REV. 1073, 1077-79 (2010) (“Ambiguity
can be intentional or unintentional; it can derive from misunderstandings about language, from
simple mistakes, from a failure to plan ahead, or from the impossibility of seeing very far ahead.”).
248 See, e.g., Richard M. Re, Clarity Doctrines, 86 CHI. L. REV. 1497, 1532-33 (2019) (discussing
theories of ambiguity and the judicial interpretation, including that of Chevron, that are triggered
by such ambiguity); Easterbrook, supra note 229, at 547-49 (1983) (discussing the gap-filling function
that many courts serve when responding to ambiguous statutes).
249 See Harold A. McDougall, Lawyering and Public Policy, 38 J. L. EDUC. 369, 379 (1988)
(“[T]he wording of a bill has a tactical importance beyond its substance . . . because the wording
influences the stability of coalitions forming around the bill and the selection of the committee or
subcommittee to which the bill will be assigned.”).
250 See Divine, supra note 8, at 149-50, 188 (arguing that statutory incorporation increases
legislative efficiency).
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President’s desk, is a process that is meant to produce good law, not fast law.251
In the face of such legislative Darwinism, only the fittest, best negotiated,
and most compromised upon bills become law, which explains why as few as
three percent of proposed bills become statutes.252 Statutory incorporation
thus serves as a shortcut that diminishes the legitimacy and efficacy of the
carefully designed legislative process.
A second and closely related reason why Congress intentionally drafts
ambiguous terms is that it allows congressmembers to side-step complex
issues and instead defer to other institutions to solve these ambiguities.253 By
refusing to take on the difficult task of negotiating difficult topics,
congressional drafters can instead pass this off to agencies or courts to solve
themselves.254 This means that opposing negotiators can walk out of the room
each with the hope that another institution will interpret the law in their favor
sometime in the future.255 Statutory incorporation accomplishes the same
goal by allowing congressmembers to shirk their legislative duties and pass
the difficult task of defining things like “burglary,” “husband,” and various
torts to state legislatures who have already defined these terms according to
the preferences of their polity. Congressmembers representing California
would be just as satisfied with those representing Texas, since they would be
able to avoid the taxing negotiating process of defining the complexities of
bankruptcy or social security statutes by instead allowing the law of their
home jurisdictions to govern how federal law will apply to their constituents.
*

*

*

Where federalism and delegation theories fall short, interest-based
incorporation offers a more complete explanation on why Congress so
251 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1441,
1444-46 (2008) (describing nine “vetogates” that present multiple opportunities to kill a bill, which
can often be successfully thwarted by only a few congressmembers).
252 See Divine, supra note 8, at 150 (noting that recent Congresses, even during years when one
party controlled the legislative and executive branches, passed as few as two to three percent of
proposed bills into law).
253 See Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The
Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627, 641 (2002) (“[I]t is
not unusual for competing factions of Congress to ‘agree to disagree’ in the drafting of a statute [and
seek resolution from another institution].”).
254 See Levmore, supra note 247, at 1079 n.18 (acknowledging that intentional ambiguities
amount to Congress “essentially asking some agent, often unidentified, to do the work” that
Congress should have done to give the statute meaning); Gluck & Bressman, Statutory Interpretation
Part I, supra note 5, at 1015 (reporting that drafters knowingly “punt[]” difficult questions to other
decisionmakers by drafting ambiguous terms).
255 See Nourse & Schacter, supra note 5, at 596-97 (noting congressional intent to draft words
with “deliberate ambiguity” with the hope that courts or agencies will interpret the law favorably).
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frequently relies on statutory incorporation. Interest-based incorporation
offers a realistic look into how self-interested politicians seek to continue
their careers in politics by passing laws that maximize political benefits while
mitigating political risks. Statutory incorporation allows individual
congressmembers to reap the benefits of scapegoating, interest group politics,
and drafting ambiguous terms. Congress may indeed be the most political
branch of the federal government, so it should come as no surprise that
congressmembers are the most politically motivated members of the federal
government as well.
IV. INCORPORATING THE IMPLICATIONS
Statutory incorporation proves to be the result of complex and
overlapping congressional considerations. Part II of this Article explores
why the scholarly narrative that federalism and delegation theories justify
statutory incorporation are incomplete. In this context, Part III proposes that
interest-based considerations hold explanatory value.
This Part continues in the spirit of statutory realism to propose judicial
and congressional interventions in light of these new understandings. Judges
might think differently about how they should interpret federal incorporative
statutes with the proper underlying assumptions of congressional selfinterest. Instead of presuming legislative intent based on federalism or
delegation grounds, this Part argues that judges should consider checking
congressional self-interest instead of enabling it. Congress too might think
differently in how they can further maximize their self-interest without
producing the troubling disparities of statutory incorporation surveyed in
Part I. Instead of shirking its legislative responsibility and relying on interest
groups and ambiguity, it can further expand its institutional resources and
create advisory agencies to offer the type of time, research, and expertise
necessary to properly consider the consequences of incorporating state law.
A. Judicial Interventions
Whenever one wades into the debates of statutory interpretation, the
ultimate purpose of canons and what they should accomplish is a necessary
starting point. Scholars like Adrian Vermeule and Cass Sunstein acknowledge
that canons operate as legal fictions, but nevertheless find such fictions useful
if they help facilitate judicial efficiency and create sustainable legal rules.256
256 See Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 2, at 915 (explaining how interpretive theories can
facilitate judicial efficiency); see also Gluck & Bressman, Statutory Interpretation Part II, supra note 5,
at 728 (outlining theories “less tethered to the details of how Congress works,” but more concerned
with coordinating legal rules that assist judges).
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Such scholars would likely have mixed feelings on the fictions that prop up
statutory incorporation; while federalism and delegation serve as simple legal
fictions that imagine Congress’s dedication to these ideals, these fictions have
only served to muddle judicial economy and question fair treatment and
legitimacy within several areas of the law.257
Others believe in legislative supremacy, where courts are faithful agents
to fulfill congressional intent. Under this theory, canons are formalist tools to
divine congressional intent in ways that may make sense to legally trained
judges.258 However, statutory realists have proven that legislative drafters
have very little training or concern regarding these legal tools of
interpretation and actually draft the vast majority of legislation in ways that
contradict or diminish the efficacy of these canons.259 The recent surge in
statutory realism is rooted in a long-standing desire of scholars and judges to
better understand the statutory drafting process with the goal of adjusting
their interpretations accordingly.260 Without such a connection between how
Congress drafts statutes and how courts interpret them, judges are merely
playing pretend in a world of make-believe.
What follows is both an embrace of statutory realism and a rejection of
legislative supremacy. If anything, these principles conflict. Statutory realism
is a useful school that shows how statutes are actually drafted, passed, and
enacted; interest-based incorporation fits nicely under this larger umbrella as
it seeks to argue that statutory incorporation is actually used as a tool to
benefit political players in the legislative process. With this understanding,
why should congressional self-interest reign supreme over the judiciary in a
government built on checks and balances? No branch’s intent—especially if it
is a fictitious intent—should rule supreme, and courts should think carefully
about their role in letting congressional self-interests reign. Instead, perhaps
they should think about their role in reigning it in.261 While the proposed
See supra Part I.
See Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes,
32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 827, 841-42 (1991) (describing legislative supremacy); see also STEPHEN
BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 96 (2010) (arguing that the Court’s
role is to “help Congress better accomplish its own legislative work.”).
259 See Nourse & Schacter, supra note 5, at 615-16 (“[S]taffers are asked to create legislation in an
institution whose incentives and institutional attributes are quite different from those of courts.”); Gluck &
Bressman, Statutory Interpretation Part II, supra note 5, at 728 (“[M]any other influences . . . have more
relevance to the drafting process than most of the Court’s interpretive rules.”).
260 See, e.g., id.; see also Robert A. Katzmann, Statutes, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 637, 660 (2012)
(arguing that the realities of congressional drafting are completely divorced from debates and
theories on statutory interpretation).
261 See Levmore, supra note 247, at 1083 (discussing courts’ role in enabling charades of
Congress when they draft ambiguous statutes); THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM:
THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES 92-126 (2d ed. 1979) (criticizing the Court’s
refusal to reign in congressional delegation of power).
257
258
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judicial interventions are far from exhaustive, this Part seeks to start a more
robust conversation among judges and scholars about ways the judiciary can
properly serve its constitutional mandate to balance powers and check
congressional self-interest.
1. Ambiguity Canons
An effective starting point for judicial intervention would be to repurpose
existing ambiguity canons to interpret federal incorporative statutes in the
light most favorable to the individual. The rule of lenity, which requires that
ambiguous criminal statutes be interpreted in favor of the criminal
defendant,262 could be expanded to consider statutory incorporation as an
ambiguity due to its multiple interpretations and applications across the states.
This rule of lenity has also been applicable in other contexts outside of the
criminal law, including ambiguous immigration statutes being interpreted
in favor of noncitizens facing deportation,263 and even favoring bankruptcy
debtors when facing deprivations of property due to ambiguous statutes.264 By
focusing on supporting individual defendants and noncitizens, courts can
indirectly thwart congressional self-interests and increase congressional
accountability by facilitating consistent results that favor individuals in the
criminal, property, and liability areas where statutory incorporation is used.
Although the rule of lenity is rarely applied, this section argues that a
judicial expansion of its application would be beneficial when interpreting
incorporative statutes. As the canon currently stands, lenity is only employed
if a statute meets a high standard of ambiguity,265 and even then it is only

262 See Rule of Lenity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see also Johnson v. United
States, 576 U.S. 591, 613-16 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (describing the history of the rule of
lenity in American jurisprudence).
263 See, e.g., INS. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320 (2001) (affirming use of lenity in immigration
contexts); see also Brian G. Slocum, The Immigration Rule of Lenity and Chevron Deference, 17 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 515, 516-17 (2003) (outlining Court precedent establishing the immigration rule of
lenity to protect against the drastic penalty of deportation).
264 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY app. B
at 19-41 (4th ed. 2007) (describing hundreds of canons, including those that construe ambiguities in
favor of bankruptcy debtors); see also 11 RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 32:12, at 471-80 (4th ed. 1999) (outlining contract rule of interpretation contra
proferentem, that interprets ambiguous language against the party who drafted it).
265 See Brian G. Slocum, The Importance of Being Ambiguous: Substantive Canons, Stare Decisis,
and the Central Role of Ambiguity Determinations in the Administrative State, 69 MD. L. REV. 791, 80608 (2010) (explaining the difficulty of consistently applying the rule of lenity due to ambiguity
standards necessary to trigger its application).
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used as a canon of last resort.266 The mere “existence of some statutory
ambiguity . . . is not sufficient to warrant [its] application,”267 but instead
there must be “a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the language.”268 Courts
have yet to apply the rule of lenity to instances of statutory incorporation,269
and such an expansion need only be applied as necessary to hold congress
accountable for its flawed federal incorporative statutes. In practice, criminal
defendants facing charges would face the most favorable interpretation under
state law. So a defendant who committed “burglary” in Colorado would only
trigger federal liability if a defendant committed the highest form of burglary
in that jurisdiction, such as burglaries in the first degree or those that include
use of a deadly weapon.270 This would apply across the board to the many
state crimes incorporated in federal law, and would necessitate the first degree
murder, robbery, and other incorporated crimes to trigger harsh federal
penalties such as mandatory minimum sentences or deportation for
noncitizens.271 Statutes like the ACA that create federal criminal liability for
the violation of state law would also require the highest degree of any such
state law to trigger federal liability. It should not be enough that lower degrees
of trespassing, nonviolent drug offenses, petty theft, and a host of other
crimes should trigger the harsh sanctions of federal criminal law.
Researchers have shown that congressional drafters have very little
knowledge or respect for the rule of lenity and draft such harsh federal
criminal laws without regard to how the rule of lenity might apply to an
ambiguous criminal statute.272 This is all the more reason to hold
congressmembers accountable by expanding the rule of lenity. Apparently,
congressmembers and their staffers are too worried about their self-interests
to adequately educate themselves on the rights of criminal defendants and

266 See United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 17 (1994) (explaining that the rule of lenity should
only be triggered after courts have employed all other traditional canons and are still left with an
ambiguity).
267 Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138 (1998).
268 United States v. Walker, 720 F.3d 705, 708-09 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting Chapman v. United
States, 500 U.S. 453, 463 (1991)) (internal quotations omitted).
269 See, e.g., Shular v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 779, 786-87 (2020) (rejecting the application of
the rule of lenity to the ACCA).
270 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-4-202 (2020) (defining burglary in the first degree to
include use of a deadly weapon).
271 Currently, courts employ a categorical approach taking into account the elements of state
crimes and comparing them to corresponding federal elements to make categorical matches. See
Evans, supra note 11, at 1781-84 (explaining complex steps of categorical approach). The rule of lenity
would simplify this process by asking if the defendant’s conduct or conviction amounted to the
highest criminal definition of state law in that jurisdiction to trigger federal criminal or immigration
penalties.
272 See Gluck & Bressman, Statutory Interpretation Part I, supra note 5, at 946-47 (explaining
that many drafters are not familiar with the rule of lenity).
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noncitizens; the rule of lenity is one of the quintessential canons that courts
should double down on and reinforce with vigor if for nothing else than to
check congressional obliviousness to effect a change.
Expanding the rule of lenity to apply to statutory incorporation would
benefit individuals but would also check congressional self-interest by
increasing congressmembers’ political accountability. In a perverse way,
Congress rarely pays attention to its lawmaking failures without sufficient
public outcry; and such public outcry is usually only reserved for extreme
cases of violence or miscarriages of justice.273 Thus, if the courts apply the
rule of lenity to increase individual liberty, this may indeed result in people
that the public considers dangerous going free or facing more lenient
punishments. It may seem morally abhorrent to let potentially dangerous
criminals off the hook by expanding rules of lenity, but it is logically sound
because these are the few instances where Congress is truly held accountable
for their legislative failures in the face of such moral panics. Indeed, this
unfortunate reality goes to the crux of this Article; Congress is self-interested
and will rarely change course unless there is sufficient political accountability
attached to its actions.
Expanding the rule of lenity is a worthwhile consideration for the
judiciary, but it is still unsatisfying because the problems of nonuniformity
would remain. Although many defendants and noncitizens will be treated
more fairly, their federal rights will still be tied to the respective state laws of
their domicile. Texans will still be judged by Texas law, even though they will
benefit from being judged by the most favorable aspect of that law. This can
still lead to nonuniform outcomes because a similarly situated Californian can
only benefit by the most favorable interpretation of California law, which may
be more or less than that enjoyed by their Texas twin.
2. Highest-Denominator Canon
As an alternative to ambiguity canons, a second canon of interpretation
that could address the problems of nonuniformity is a highest denominator
canon, or a way that courts could apply the highest state-law standard to the
entire country. In practice, courts would seek the highest denominator among
all state laws and adopt that standard as the uniform federal rule.274 For
statutes that incorporate all fifty state versions of “burglary,” the courts might
273 See, e.g., Wayne A. Logan, Megan’s Laws as a Case Study in Political Stasis, 61 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 371, 373-80 (2011) (outlining public outcry and political response to develop federal sex offender
registries and laws after state laws were deemed inadequate to protect children from sexual violence).
274 The courts might also consider simply developing their own federal common law definition
of incorporated terms like “burglary” or “child,” but this would refute the language of many statutes
that require state law to play a role.
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adopt the one state law that has the highest standard for convicting a
defendant for that crime. Let’s say, for argument’s sake, courts find that
Minnesota’s first-degree burglary statute is the highest standard of burglary—
and thus the most lenient to criminal defendants—because it requires
common law elements that include a (1) night-time (2) breaking (3) and
entering (4) with the premeditated intent (5) to commit a felonious theft (6)
with a deadly weapon. It would be incredibly difficult to convict a defendant
under this hypothetical statute because of the number of unique elements that
rarely apply to most modern burglaries. Thus, under the highest-denominator
canon, courts would incorporate Minnesota’s burglary standard across all
federal statutes that were intended to incorporate state definitions of
“burglary.” The same could be done by incorporating the most lenient
standards of “husband,” “wife,” or “child” for social security benefits, or
incorporating the unlimited homestead exemptions enjoyed in Texas and
Florida into bankruptcy statutes to allow debtors across the country to gain
the maximum benefits under the most favorable standards among the states.
Once again, by using the judicial power of interpretation to empower individuals,
as opposed to congressional self-interest, the judicial branch would effectively
check the abdication and dereliction of duty congressmembers exhibit by
employing statutory incorporation.275
Similar to the prescribed ambiguity canons, the highest-denominator
canon rejects interpretive theories of legislative supremacy in order to
embrace the courts’ role to check Congress. Instead of faithfully following
congressional intent when it expressly or indirectly contradicts principles of
federal uniformity, legitimacy, and efficiency, courts should instead interpret
statutes in a way that promotes these principles.276
This approach carries the benefits of nationwide uniformity while also
empowering state law in a way that current statutory incorporation does not.
Instead of creating fifty different applications of a federal statute, courts can
interpret the statute to incorporate a single state’s law that will apply across
the country. This uniform standard maximizes benefits to citizens because—
like the ambiguity canons—it chooses the most lenient and beneficial
standards for defendants, noncitizens, debtors, and beneficiaries alike. This
canon would also be a more effective embodiment of federalism and
delegation ideals. By picking the most lenient state laws to incorporate into
federal statutes, courts would empower states’ laws and leverage states’
275 See Logan, Creating a Hydra in Government, supra note 28, at 85 (describing congressional
incorporation of state criminal law as an “abdicat[ion] [of] its criminal lawmaking authority in deference
to individual states.”).
276 See Radha A. Pathak, Incorporated State Law, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 823, 846-47 (outlining
several cases where federal courts ignored state law and instead interpreted federal incorporative
statutes in ways that forwarded federal interests).
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expertise in picking the best option that forwards federal goals. This
encourages state experimentation, competition, and expertise in ways that
clumsily incorporating all state statutes does not.
Both the highest-denominator canon and the ambiguity canons seek to
interpret the law in the most favorable light to defendants, debtors, and those
opposing the government. While this need not be the case, it is the simplest
way to fix the unjust geographical discrimination imposed by statutory
incorporation. Surely, courts could adequately check congressional abdication
of lawmaking authority by adopting the lowest denominator, or by interpreting
ambiguous terms according to the median state laws. There is no perfect
explanation on why we should settle for the highest denominator or the most
favorable interpretation for the individual other than it produces the most
just result by remedying past unjust geographical discrimination.
The highest-denominator canon carries significant benefits but must also
be contextualized with its costs. For one, it would further tax judicial economy
since nearly every federal incorporative statute would require a fifty-state
survey of state laws to find the highest denominator. For example, this process
would be easier for homestead exemptions that have an easily determinable
highest denominator since several states have an unlimited homestead exemption.
This would be much more difficult for criminal statutes since they are legion
across the states. Undoubtedly, litigants would carry most of the costs of this
research and present it to courts in their briefings, but courts would still have
to carry the burden of determining these highest denominators across all state
laws. Judicial economy might also be saved when courts rely on each other’s
research and adopt uniform standards without recreating the wheel if one
such court has already determined the highest denominator of a given statute.
And when compared to the current taxation of judicial economy,277 these ex
ante costs may prove to be more efficient in the long run once uniform
standards have been established.
Another shortfall of the highest-denominator canon would be its inability
to alleviate the geographical discrimination of statutes like the ACA or the
FTCA. These statutes specifically federalize the criminal and tort actions of
the particular state where a prescribed action took place. So if a defendant
commits a crime in a federal park in Wyoming, Wyoming criminal law will
govern an ACA indictment. There is no way to re-engineer or interpret the
ACA to criminalize the law of another state in such an instance. So while
applying the highest-denominator canon would benefit most federal
incorporative statutes, there will still be outliers that will require
congressional interventions to fix.
277 See supra notes 47, 117–119 and accompanying text (discussing judicial complaints about the
difficulty of applying the law when interpreting incorporative statutes).
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3. Federal–State Interest Canon
Perhaps the least ambitious solution is the most practical, which would
allow for courts to differentiate among the many different federal incorporative
statutes to discern which subject matters promote important federal interests
versus those that promote primary and important state interests. This author
has previously suggested such an approach in the separate but related field of
the categorical approach, a judicial tool used in criminal sentencing and
immigration incorporative statutes.278 This canon would encourage courts to
draw lines based on tradition, practice, and constitutional norms to determine
which statutes serve a constitutional national interest and which serve state
interests, thus tailoring their interpretation based on subject matter.279
To illustrate this conceptual canon, compare criminal and immigration
law. Criminal law is traditionally seen as a state power that seeks to regulate
certain behavior through criminal punishment. This tradition was broken
with sweeping federalization of criminal law throughout the 1980s and 1990s,
when Congress passed thousands of criminal statutes280 during an era of
“tough on crime” political rhetoric that was pushed to maximize political
gain.281 The many overlapping federal and state crimes has resulted in
perverse negotiations between state and federal prosecutors on who will
prosecute a defendant whose crimes could fall into either’s docket, usually
based on who can get the most jailtime for the defendant.282 And even with
the exponentially increased involvement that federal law enforcement has
taken in criminal law in the past forty years, the states remain the primary
arbiter of criminal justice.283
278 See Evans, supra note 11, at 1834-36 (discussing the merits of a categorial approach tailored
to the unique policy goals of criminal sentencing statutes and immigration laws).
279 See Pathak, supra note 276, at 846-47 (describing a similar phenomenon, where federal
courts have implicitly adopted interpretations of state law when it benefits federal interests in certain
subject matters).
280 See Sara Sun Beale, Rethinking the Identity and Role of United States Attorneys, 6 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 369, 392, 399 (2009) (counting nearly 4,000 federal crimes); Lisa L. Miller & James
Eisenstein, The Federal/State Criminal Prosecution Nexus: A Case Study in Cooperation and Discretion,
30 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 239, 242-43 (2005) (explaining the history of the federalization of crime and
noting that “[a] report by the American Bar Association Task Force on the Federalization of Criminal
Law reports that over 40% of all federal criminal statutes enacted since the Civil War were passed
after 1970” (citation omitted)).
281 See Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 748-49 (2005) (linking
political incentives in the 1990s with tough-on-crime rhetoric and legislation).
282 See Ronald F. Wright, Federal or State? Sorting as a Sentencing Choice, 21 CRIM. JUST. 16, 1920 (2006) (explaining the sorting that federal and state prosecutors, law enforcement, and other
decisionmakers engage in when deciding to prosecute a person in state or federal court).
283 See, e.g., E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., DEPT. OF JUSTICE, NCJ 251149,
PRISONERS IN 2016, at 3 (2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p16.pdf [https://perma.cc/5UENZW75] (indicating that federal prisoners made up thirteen percent of the total U.S. prison population,
with states holding the rest).
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Compare this to the constitutional mandate “[t]o establish an uniform
Rule of Naturalization”284 and over one-hundred years of the federal
government establishing its unilateral power to deport noncitizens and
preempting states from enacting laws attempting to do the same.285 The
Court has often stressed the importance that, in immigration law, the nation
speaks with one national voice that signals one uniform national sentiment
on the treatment of foreign nationals.286 Bankruptcy occupies an interesting
conflicting position, having a similar constitutional mandate for Congress to
establish “uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the
United States”287 while also relying so heavily on property rights that have
always been the purview of the states.288 Indeed, the stark differences between
states’ homestead provisions can be considered a result of rich state histories
and community norms of property rights. It is no coincidence that the states
with higher or unlimited homestead exemptions are also those that were
historically agrarian, thus engraining in the community the importance of
keeping one’s home and land as a part of their livelihood and personal
identity.289
These brief histories are enough to appreciate the different contexts that
may sway courts to allow Congress more leeway for state law to affect federal
criminal sanctions, but heavily constrict Congress’s attempt to let state law
influence federal immigration outcomes. Bankruptcy occupies an odd middle
ground in this framework. These histories, constitutional considerations, and
national interests are the types of things courts may consider in adopting a
federal–state interest canon. For all the flaws, messiness, moral and doctrinal
problems that statutory incorporation creates, courts may decide to preserve
statutory incorporation in statutes that serve to promote state interests but
check congressional abdication of federal lawmaking authority in contexts
with strong national interests. This is certainly not an exhaustive list of
considerations that a federal–state interest canon might employ, but

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 382-83 (1971) (preempting states from affecting certain
rights of noncitizens); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 420 (1948) (preempting states
from regulating immigrant rights because the power was reserved for the federal government).
286 See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 409 (2012) (discussing the need for sole federal
power in the immigration sphere to speak with “one voice” for the purposes of foreign relations).
287 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
288 See supra notes 58-77 and accompanying text (discussing the role of property rights in
bankruptcy law).
289 See generally Paul Goodman, The Emergence of Homestead Exemption in the United States:
Accommodation and Resistance to the Market Revolution, 1840–1880, 80 J. AM. HIST. 470 (1993)
(detailing the historical reasoning and importance of homestead exemptions in the American West
and South).
284
285
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nevertheless starts a thoughtful consideration that statutory incorporation
may be more appropriate in limited areas of the law.
This consideration also raises an interesting question of identity. As
Professor Logan considers, should our federal laws “embrace[] the antebellum
view that individuals are tribe-like members of the states,” or promote the
political ideals of being “national citizens of a larger federal republic[?]”290
This begs even more questions. What are people’s personal identities in this
country? Do they consider themselves more of a Texan, or more of an
American? And is this sense of personal identity material to how they should
be treated in different areas of the law? In some cases, perhaps state rights
should prevail. In other cases, federal interests should prevail. This is the
balance of power that has preserved our Republic, and need not be abandoned
in the statutory incorporation corner of the law.
*

*

*

These judicial interventions are not exhaustive but are meant to start a broader
conversation on how statutory interpretation can be modeled to handle the unique
challenges presented by statutory incorporation. Courts no longer need to apply
the legal fiction that statutory incorporation is meant to communicate Congress’s
intent to promote ivory-tower principles of empowering state law through
federalism or delegating to states that have some advantage of expertise. Instead,
courts can interpret these federal incorporative statutes in a way that properly
checks congressional self-interests and promotes nationwide interests or that uses
a method to tailor interpretation according to prevailing state or federal interests.
B. Congressional Interventions
Courts will indeed play an important role in checking congressional
self-interest, but there are also institutional changes that Congress itself
could explore that would increase their political aims while also mitigating
the harms of statutory incorporation. This brief section outlines a few
such institutional changes that would expand congressional lawmaking
capacities and also empower the voice of state legislatures within the
federal lawmaking process. Just like the judicial interventions explored
above, this is far from an exhaustive list of potential congressional
interventions, but nevertheless starts a scholarly conversation of how to

290

See Logan, Creating a Hydra in Government, supra note 28, at 89-90.
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think about Congress’s role in remedying the harmful imperfections of
statutory incorporation.291
First, Congress can seek to expand its institutional resources by
creating additional legislation and budgeting departments within the
Capitol. Legislative scholars have noted for decades that Congress simply
does not have the time, resources, or expertise necessary to develop wellcrafted statutes.292 With their power of the purse, congressmembers have
rarely faced opposition from within their own ranks when it comes to
giving themselves raises,293 expanding the jurisdiction of committees, or
determining that they need more resources in their own budget to do their jobs
effectively.294
Congressmembers already benefit from a number of resources that assist the
drafting process, including individual staff, committee staff, the Office of
Legislative Counsel (OLC), and the Congressional Research Service.295 What is
to stop Congress from expanding such institutional resources to further help the
legislative process? Specifically, as applied to statutory incorporation, Congress
may benefit from expanding research staff, expanding the OLC, or commissioning
another legislative research department whose sole goal is to analyze potential
disparities or discriminatory effects of proposed legislation. Expanded research
staff or a new legislative department would carry many benefits, such as analyzing
potential racial disparities of proposed legislation,296 class disparities, and for
purposes of statutory incorporation, geographical or regional disparities.
291 See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 133-34 (1980) (arguing that Congress might expand its native capacities to overcome current
limitations).
292 See LEE DRUTMAN, THE BUSINESS OF AMERICA IS LOBBYING: HOW CORPORATIONS
BECAME POLITICIZED AND POLITICS BECAME MORE CORPORATE 34 (2015) (arguing that
congressional capacity is too limited “to develop meaningful policy expertise.”).
293 See generally IDA A. BRUDNICK & PAUL E. DWYER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 91-1011, SALARIES OF
MEMBERS OF CONGRESS: RECENT ACTIONS AND HISTORICAL TABLES (2021) (recording history of
congressional pay raises). But see Golden, Fitzpatrick Successfully Block Pay Raise for Congress in Government
Funding Bill, CONGRESSMAN JARED GOLDEN (Dec. 22, 2020), https://golden.house.gov/media/pressreleases/golden-fitzpatrick-successfully-block-pay-raise-congress-government-funding [https://perma.cc/
Q28L-JWNN] (showing example of congressmembers voting against self-interest in giving themselves a
pay raise in bleak economic times).
294 See CHRISTOPHER J. DEERING & STEVEN S. SMITH, COMMITTEES IN CONGRESS 2730 (3d ed. 1997) (discussing historical expansion of committees and Congress’s prerogative to create
new committees and expand their jurisdiction).
295 See Sitaraman, supra note 5, at 87-91 (explaining different legislative resources of members
of Congress).
296 Several states already require racial impact statements to accompany all new criminal justice bills
being considered by the legislature to inform lawmakers how proposed laws would impact communities of
color. See Nicole D. Porter, Racial Impact Statements, T HE S ENT ’ G P ROJECT (Feb. 24,
2021), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/racial-impact-statements [https://perma.cc/UNB8D4EY] (“Nine states—Iowa, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Oregon, Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, and
Virginia—have implemented mechanisms for the preparation and consideration of racial impact statements;
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Any such expansion of congressional resources carries the dual benefits of
serving congressional self-interests while also potentially mitigating the harms of
disparities across society. Congressmembers would have even more resources at
their disposal, more research capacity, and more insight into the practical effects of
proposed legislation. In essence, Congress would be serving its own self-interests
by expanding its access to resources. This neither constrains Congress nor increases
congressmembers’ political liability. Instead, it merely allocates more resources and
further expands the power of Congress. This is a win-win for self-interested
congressmembers and their constituents who are governed by the laws they pass.
Second, this suggestion may be even more palatable to congressional self-interests
if these expanded resources came in the form of a quasi-legislative agency that
served an advisory function. By using these newfound resources to create an
advisory agency—somewhat similar to the United States Sentencing Commission’s
role in updating and advising Congress on criminal sentencing and reform297—
Congress can get the benefits of agency expertise and retain the ability to scapegoat
the agency if there is political backlash.
Taking this prescription even one step further would consider a potential
role for an already-existing organization like the National Conference of State
Legislatures (NCSL).298 This little-known organization is a council of state
legislatures similar to national councils of governors299 and mayors.300 The
NCSL is a ready-made council of state legislatures that have the expertise and
insight into the very state law that Congress seeks to incorporate into federal
statutes. By commissioning the NCSL or even inviting them to consult or advise
on federal legislation, Congress would gain the benefits of its expertise301 and could
further explore the potential effects legislation might have on different state

in addition, the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission develops racial impact statements without
statutory guidance.”).
297 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 994, 995 (congressional instruction to Sentencing Commission to create
sentencing guidelines, policy statements, reports, and conduct business necessary to function as an
independent body); see In re President’s Comm’n on Organized Crime Subpoena of Scaduto, 763 F.2d
1191, 1205 (11th Cir. 1985) (Roney, J., concurring) (distinguishing between advisory commissions and
those with “autonomous authority to . . . implement final binding action”).
298 See About Us, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, https://www.ncsl.org/aboutus.aspx
[https://perma.cc/SH34-82W6] (describing a bipartisan organization representing state and territorial
legislatures that seeks “to foster interstate cooperation and facilitate the exchange of information among
legislatures.”).
299 See NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N, https://www.nga.org/cog [https://perma.cc/7KLM-59AE]
(describing bipartisan council of ten governors that represent governors of all states and territories).
300 See U.S. CONF. OF MAYORS, https://www.usmayors.org [https://perma.cc/PL9Y-AFBE]
(describing bipartisan organization of over 3,000 mayors across the nation).
301 The expertise of the NCLS is indeed quite different than the expertise of individual state
legislatures. The former benefits from having experienced delegates from each state serve, whereas
the latter does not have such resources or benefits.
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citizens while retaining the political safety valve of scapegoating the NCSL in times
of political backlash.
Expanding congressional resources in a way that adds the research and
expertise necessary to responsibly incorporate state law—whether doing so inhouse, creating a new advisory agency, or inviting input from the NCSL—
would benefit the lawmaking process and serve to mitigate the harmful
disparities of statutory incorporation. By having a better understanding of
geographical discrimination, Congress may indeed reform or rethink the
problematic applications of incorporative statutes from the past and in the
future. In turn, the benefits of federalism and delegation would no longer be
fictions; instead, Congress would actually benefit from the expertise of an advisory
agency or the NCSL and would actually empower states by educating
themselves on states’ laws and gaining insight from the input of state legislators.
From an efficiency or political perspective, some may balk at the suggestion of
making Congress and its already robust support system even bigger, arguing
instead that society benefits when government minimizes the amount of human
capital required to run a legal system.302 With the degrees of legislative problems
explored in this paper, considered alongside the political interests of individual
congress members, policymakers and society alike may very well be willing to
forego the hypothesized benefits of a smaller and leaner legislature for larger and
more effective one. Given the increasing complexity of the legislative process303
and the possibilities for congressmembers to allocate themselves more resources to
increase their staffs and other independent research and drafting departments
inside the Capitol, expanding the legislature is a solution worth considering.
CONCLUSION
Our republic of statutes should be built on reality, not fiction. The fictions of
statutory incorporation should be appreciated for what they are and what they are
not. The ideals of federalism and delegation meant to justify Congress’s
incorporation of state law into federal statutes serve as theoretical frameworks
trying to make sense of a unique statutory structure that produces troubling
nonuniformity, unfair disparities, and moral ambiguities. When held up to the
scrutiny of how statutory incorporation works in practice along with interventions
302 See Daniel Martin Katz & M. J. Bommarito II, Measuring the Complexity of the Law: The
United States Code, 22 A.I. & L. 337, 338-340 (2014) (discussing the disadvantages of overly complex
legislative drafting).
303 For explanations on the increasing complexity of the law, see, for example, Byron Holz,
Note, Chaos Worth Having: Irreducible Complexity and Pragmatic Jurisprudence, 8 MINN. J.L. SCI. &
TECH. 303, 333 (2007) (discussing the interplay between complex legal systems and judicial
decisionmaking); and R. George Wright, The Illusion of Simplicity: An Explanation of Why the Law
Can’t Just Be Less Complex, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 715, 717 (2000) (discussing the multidimensional
nature of legal complexity).
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of statutory realism, these theories fall short to justify statutory incorporation as a
beneficial legislative tool. The theory of interest-based incorporation sheds new
light and contributes a new framework to judge the merits of statutory
incorporation. Congressmembers are less concerned with imbuing erudite theories
into legislation but are worried about self-interested political goals to which
statutory incorporation is a useful tool. Thus, interest-based incorporation gives
further insight into how judges and scholars should think about, interpret, and
analyze statutory incorporation in ways that properly match how congressmembers
think about, interpret, and analyze the statutes they enact. Given the tremendous
breadth and impact statutory incorporation has on so many Americans in criminal
justice, immigration, tort, social security, bankruptcy, and even more areas of the
law, interest-based incorporation represents an important next step in this growing
policy conversation.
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